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Abstract
This thesis analyses three distinct economic problems through the common lens of
informational asymmetries. In each chapter we show how market behaviour is best un-
derstood as the outcome of differentially informed market participants interacting with
each other within the rules specified by the respective market under consideration.
Chapter 2 provides an explanation for the variety of contracts offered by competitive
firms for seemingly identical products or services, e.g. in mobile communication or
personal banking. We show that firms’ menu of tariffs can be understood as screening
devices for consumers with mistaken beliefs about their future demand. We further-
more show that while competition between firms prevents firms from exploiting their
customers’ limited cognitive ability, competition is not able to correct the inefficiency
caused by customers making suboptimal choices.
Chapter 3 studies the effect of a financial transaction tax on the trading of a security.
We construct a market microstructure model and estimate it using intraday transaction
data for a stock traded on the NYSE (Ashland Inc.). The estimates are then used to
simulate how a financial transaction tax would impact volume, spreads and informa-
tional efficiency in the asset market under consideration.
Chapter 4 constructs a model of observational learning with payoff externalities that
provides a justification for the use of short term debt in the financing of investment
projects. While financing with debt that is subject to roll over risk is often seen as
a source of instability, potentially triggering investor runs on financially sound institu-
tions, we show that it can play an important role in facilitating the revelation of privately
held information about future performance of the investment.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
How informational asymmetries between market participants translate into market out-
comes is strongly contingent on the structure the market imposes on the interactions
between actors. Among the main determinants of market structure are the composition
of the trading population, the actions these traders are allowed to undertake and the
amount of information feedback they get about their and others’ actions.
In this thesis we will consider three economic problems for which, in our opinion,
market behaviour is best explained when perceived as the outcome of the interactions
of differentially informed market participants. For each problem in turn we will show
how asymmetric information together with important structural features of the mar-
ket under consideration, such as the contract forms allowed for trade or the degree
of competition between suppliers of goods, allow us to bring economic reasoning to
bear on observed market outcomes and trace these back to the core economic forces at
work. While chapters 2 and 4 rely on the tools of economic theory, in particular game
theory and mechanism design, to perform this exercise, chapter 3 combines empirical
and theoretical work by estimating a structural model of an asset market in order to
quantify important underlying structural parameters of the market.
Chapter 2 provides an explanation for the variety of contracts offered by competi-
tive firms for seemingly identical products or services, e.g. in mobile communication
or personal banking. We show that two competing firms offering menus of nonlin-
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ear price schedules to customers with mistaken priors about their future demand will
be able to screen these customers on the basis of their priors. Firms’ use of tariff
menus can thus be understood as screening devices for boundedly rational consumers.
However while such menus allow firms to screen their customers according to their
ability to correctly forecast future demand, they do not allow them to extract additional
rents provided the market is sufficiently competitive and firms’ have identical priors
concerning their customers types. Competition thus guarantees that each tariff only
covers the fixed costs of the firm, but it cannot remedy the mistaken demand forecasts
of customers.
Chapter 3 studies the effect the introduction of a financial transaction tax would have
on the trading of a security. To this purpose we construct a market microstructure
model and estimate it using intraday transaction data for a stock traded on the NYSE
(Ashland Inc.). The estimates are then used to simulate how a financial transaction tax
would impact volume, spreads and informational efficiency in the asset market under
consideration. Our structural model includes price elastic liquidity traders as well as
informed traders with signals of heterogeneous quality. Both features are essential
for our analyses as the impact of the tax will crucially depend on how it affects the
composition of the trading population in the market. Our results suggest that liquidity
trade is relatively price inelastic and thus the tax predominantly affects informed trade.
The reduction in informed trade is found to be substantial. A 0.2% tax on transactions,
as has for example been implemented in France, would lead to a 10% drop in volume in
our asset market. While spreads can be reduced by the tax as less informed trade in the
market means that spreads have to provide less protection against traders with superior
information, we find that convergence of the asset price to the fundamental value of
the asset can be slowed down considerably. We find, for example, that a tax of 0.5%
per transaction would lead to a complete crowding out of informed trade and thus the
asset market would lose its ability to aggregate private information through asset prices.
The final chapter of this thesis constructs a model of observational learning that pro-
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vides a justification for the use short term debt subject to roll over risk in the financing
of investment projects. While such arrangements are often seen as a source of insta-
bility, potentially triggering investor runs on financially sound institutions, we show
that they can play an important role in facilitating the revelation of privately held
information about future performance. When investors can learn about the profitabil-
ity of a project by observing other investors’ funding decisions, waiting rather than
withdrawing funding upon receiving negative information has a positive option value.
Under equitable sharing rules for liquidation revenue this option value can outweigh
the negative information received by individual investors and lead to the survival of
unprofitable investment projects. Providing financial incentives for early withdrawers
can counteract this option value effect and implement efficient liquidation decisions.
Here the fragility of financing facilitates information aggregation, enables efficient
liquidation decisions, and thereby raises the ex-ante value of investment projects.
Chapter 2
Competitive Screening of Customers
with Non-Common Priors
2.1 Introduction
The multitude of tariffs for seemingly homogenous goods and services offered by
firms in a wide range of competitive industries, such as in mobile communications
or personal banking, constitutes a theoretical problem. While at first sight one is
tempted to infer that firms use this variety of tariffs to price discriminate between
customers with different consumption profiles, standard models of competitive price
discrimination ( Armstrong and Vickers [Armstrong and Vickers, 2001], Rochet and
Stole [Rochet and Stole, 2002]) tell us that in sufficiently competitive markets with
firms facing identical technological constraints and demand conditions, firms loose the
ability to engage in price discrimination. Competition forces all firms to offer a single
two-part tariff which consist of a fixed fee plus costs.
In this paper I will provide an explanation for these large menus of tariffs offered
by competitive firms which is based on heterogeneity in cognitive abilities of the cus-
tomer base. In doing so other possible causes which could potentially account for the
phenomenon will be ignored, most prominently among them dynamic considerations
like switching costs or asymmetries between firms both in technologies or in consumer
preferences. At the center of the analysis will be the customer’s ability to anticipate
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his consumption profile for a product which is provided by firms in a competitive
market. This ability is important as customers will have to choose between contracts
specifying price-quantity schedules before knowing their exact demand for the good.
Once signed up to a contract, they will find out about their exact valuation for the good
and will choose their optimal consumption level from this specific contract. Crucially
the firm can disagree with its customers at the time contracts are signed concerning
the customer’s consumption profile. One example would be that the firm believes its
customer is too optimistic concerning his future intensity of usage of the service. In the
technical term of the cognitive psychology literature, the firm thinks that its customer’s
beliefs are miscalibrated. I will show that if firms believe that some of their customers
have miscalibrated beliefs but these beliefs are private information, firms will design
their tariffs so as to screen customers with respect to these heterogenous beliefs. Com-
petition between firms will not prevent firms from using their menu design to screen
customers in this manner.
The results of this model allow some insights into the question of what beneficial
effects we can expect from market competition in the presence of boundedly rational
market participants. It will be shown that the standard inefficiency that price discrim-
ination creates by distorting optimal quantities for low types in order to extract more
surplus from high types will be eliminated by competition even if some of the mar-
ket participants commit mistakes in evaluating deals. However firms will not deliver
the efficient quantity schedule to all customers, as some customers’ perceived surplus
is not their actual surplus. This will induce firms to create what in the behavioral
economics literature is sometimes called fictitious surplus, surplus which only exists
in the customers imagination, will never materialize and therefore can be costlessly
provided by the firm. Competition will nevertheless ensure that firms do not make any
additional profits by creating this kind of surplus. Standard customers, i.e. customers
that shares common prior beliefs with the firms, will choose a cost plus fixed fee tariff.
This tariff turns out to be the same tariff firms would offer to this customer type if no
miscalibrated customers were present in the market. It follows that in this model the
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presence of boundedly rational customers does not exert an externality on the fully
rational customers.
Empirical Evidence on Miscalibration Calibration measures the agreement between
the objective and subjective assessment of validity of a statement. A person is therefore
perfectly calibrated if the subjective probability she assigns to any event matches the
long run frequency of occurrences of this event. In our setting a perfectly calibrated
customer can correctly quantify the probability that his marginal utility from consum-
ing a certain quantity of the good is below a given level. 1
The notion of calibration has been extensively discussed in the experimental psychol-
ogy literature ( Lichtenstein et al. [Lichtenstein et al., 1982], McClelland and Bolger
[McClelland and Bolger, 1994]). A robust result in this literature is that for a large va-
riety of situations, experimental subjects show a significant degree of miscalibration.
A well know example is the tendency of experimental subjects to overestimate their
ability to correctly answer general knowledge question.
More recently economists have begun to elicit subjective probability distributions
which matter for specific economic problems and check the goodness of calibration
of people’s beliefs. Dominitz and Manski [Dominitz and Manski, 2011] analyze prob-
abilistic beliefs concerning equity returns using data from the Michigan Survey of Con-
sumers and the Survey of Economic Expectations. They find significant interpersonal
variation but intrapersonal stability in beliefs. When compared to the long run aver-
age of equity returns, subjects tend to be miscalibrated, on average overestimating both
the mean and the volatility of returns. Similar studies have been conducted for job
losses, eligibility for social security or income uncertainty with similar results. Manski
[Manski, 2004] provides a survey of this literature.
Non-common Prior Approach At the time of contracting between customer and firm,
the exact utility the customer will derive from the good is uncertain. This uncertainty
will be indexed by a one-dimensional random variable which parameterizes the cus-
tomer’s utility function. Call this random variable θ and let its probability distribution
1This obviously presumes the existence of an objectively valid probability distribution for these
marginal utilities.
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be given by F(θ). In the following model a person will be called miscalibrated if his
prior beliefs concerning the random variable θ do not agree with the objective proba-
bility distribution F(θ).
It will be assumed that firms are perfectly calibrated, i.e. that their prior beliefs con-
cerning θ are given by F(θ). Firms know that their customers are all identical and
have a consumption profile which is determined by F(θ). Customers’ prior beliefs can
divert from F(θ). To solve the competitive model I will not have to restrict the way in
which customers’ beliefs divert from this probability distribution. All that is necessary
is that firms know in which ways their customers’ beliefs can differ from F(θ). In
order to solve the monopolistic case, I will have to impose more structure on the set of
possible deviations. I will use two criteria to order customers’ beliefs. Customers’ prior
beliefs will be allowed to divert from F(θ) either in a first order stochastic dominance
sense, or in a mean preserving spread sense. In psychological terms, customers will be
allowed to be either overpessimistic ( overoptimistic ), or underconfident ( overconfi-
dent ).
The above description of the situation with calibrated firms and miscalibrated cus-
tomers is only one possible interpretation one could give to this setup. What is crucial
is that all firms share a common prior belief concerning θ and that firms and customers
possibly disagree concerning the distribution of this variable. Another possibility would
be to interpret firms as boundedly rational and customers to be perfectly calibrated.
However it is not possible to interpret this in the sense that customers are better in-
formed concerning their tastes. Such an interpretation would alter firms’ strategies
when compared to our analysis. Firms would now gain additional information through
customers’ choices which would have to be taken into account. Disagreement about
beliefs is central to the analysis.
Related Literature There is a fast growing literature on optimal contract design in the
presence of consumer biases. Two papers are particularly close in spirit to our analysis.
Della Vigna and Malmendier [DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2006] analyse the profit-
maximizing contract when customers have time-inconsistent preferences. They show
that goods with immediate costs but delayed benefits ( investment goods ) are priced
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below marginal cost, while goods with immediate benefits but delayed costs ( leisure
goods ) are priced above marginal costs. Consumers that face self control problems
and are ( partially ) naive about it will overestimate their demand in the former case
and underestimate demand in the latter case. Firms will exploit these biases by read-
justing the price profile, i.e. raising ( lowering ) the fixed fee and adjusting the per
usage price accordingly in order to create what they call fictitious surplus. DellaVigna
and Malmendier show that these pricing patterns are observable in a wide variety of
industries ranging from health clubs to credit card companies.
Eliaz and Spiegler [Eliaz and Spiegler, 2006] extend the above analysis to a contracting
environment in which consumers have time inconsistent preferences but vary in their
degree of awareness concerning this inconsistency. While firms know that consumption
of their good will induce a change of customers’ preferences, customers assign a proba-
bility between zero and one to this shift, where this probability describes the customer’s
type unkown to the firm. Elias and Spiegler show that three part tariffs are necessary
to implement the optimal screening contract. While sufficiently naive customers will
sign exploitative contracts, in the sense that under the correct prior the contract offers
less utility than their outside option, the contract offers a commitment device for suffi-
ciently sophisitcated customers helping them to overcome their self-control problems.
Our modeling approach differs from the above papers in that it focuses on the effects
of varying degrees of demand uncertainty on the side of customers on contract design.
In Della Vigna and Malmendier [DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2006] there is no de-
mand uncertainty. Partially naive customers simply misconceive of their future de-
mand, judging it too high or too low depending on the cost structure of the problem.
Eliaz and Spiegler [Eliaz and Spiegler, 2006] introduce demand uncertainty into their
framework as partially naive consumers are unsure about future changes in their pref-
erences. However, as there are only two possible alternative preference structures, their
model does not allow to disentangle the effects of overestimating or underestimating
demand from increases in demand uncertainty without changes in the mean valuation
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for the service provided. 2
The structure of the model is very close to the setup of the Sequential Screening lit-
erature ( Armstrong [Armstrong, 1996], Courty and Li [Courty and Li, 2000]). Here a
monopolist tries to screen customers with differing demand patterns through contracts
that are offered before customers know their actual demand. Types are indexed by their
distribution functions over ex-post demand realization. Firms and customers ex-ante
hold identical priors for these distribution functions. Thus customer types can be inter-
preted as high demand / low demand types if priors are order by first order stochastic
dominance, or risky / safe customers if ordered by mean preserving spreads.
2.2 Model Setup
The Firms There are two firms A and B, which are situated at the opposite end of a
segment of unit length. Each firm produces a single good. The costs of providing a
quantity q of this good to a customer are C(q), where we assume that C′(q),C′′(q)≥ 0.
Firms offer a menu of (non-linear) price schedules to their customers. Firm i’s menu of
contracts Ji is given by
{Pi(q, j)} j∈Ji. (2.1)
A customer who has signed contract j at firm i pays Pi(q, j) for a quantity q of the
good.
Consumers Consumers are located on the line between firm A and B. A customer who
has signed contract j ∈ JA at firm A and is situated at x on the line derives a utility of
u(q,θ)−PA(q, j)− τx (2.2)
from consuming a quantity q of the good. The same consumer on contract k ∈ JB at
firm B would derive a utility of
u(q,θ)−PB(q,k)− (1− x)τ (2.3)
2The advantage of this approach is that the way in which preferences can change is completely
unrestricted. In our model ex-post preferences are indexed by a one- dimensional parameter and in
addition to that have to satisfy a single-crossing property in this parameter.
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from consuming q.
θ ∈ [θL,θH ] is a one-dimensional preference shifter. It is assumed that uq(q,θ) > 0,
uθ (q,θ) > 0, and that the utility function satisfies a standard single-crossing property
in θ , i.e.
uqθ (q,θ)> 0. (2.4)
τ is the consumer’s per-unit travel cost.
Information Structure Both consumer location x and the consumer’s demand type θ
are private information. While the consumer knows x at the time of signing a contract,
he does not know θ . He only finds out about his exact demand once he has signed a
contract. A consumer has prior beliefs concerning the possible realizations of θ which
are given by the probability distribution F(θ ,α). α will be called the consumer’s ex-
ante type. For the moment no restrictions are imposed on the parameter α . 3 Let A
designate the set of ex-ante types that are active in the market. There is a measure one
of each type α ∈ A , and for each type α this mass is distributed uniformly on the
segment between firm A and B.
Firms do not know the exact type of their customers. They only know the locational
distribution of types, the set A of active ex-ante types 4, and all firms share a common
prior belief about the distribution of θ which we will designate by F(θ).
Under my intended interpretation of the model F(θ) will be the “true” distribution of
θ , and the ex-ante type αˆ such that F(θ , αˆ) = F(θ) will be called the fully rational
type.
2.2.1 Competition in the Utility Space
Each price schedule in the firm’s menu can be considered as a deal of a certain value
that is offered by the firm to its customer. Firms compete over customers by trying to
offer them better deals, i.e. higher utility levels, through their choice of price schedules.
This idea of formalizing competition in multidimensional objects as competition in the
utility space has been first put forward by Bliss [Bliss, 1988] and further developed by
3When solving the monopoly case, α will be one-dimensional and α will order the set of distributions
{F(θ ,α)} by first order stochastic dominance or mean preserving spreads.
4For the monopolistic case, the firm will need to know the distribution of α not only its support.
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Armstrong and Vickers [Armstrong and Vickers, 2001].
Suppose firm A intended to offer a customer of type α a utility level of u. Obvi-
ously firm A would provide this utility level in a way that maximizes its own profits.
Thus the following profit maximization problem implicitly determines the quantity
schedule firm A would provide to a customer of type α if it wanted to guarantee him a
utility level u net of travel costs:
piA(u,α) = max
PA,{q(θ ,α)}
∫ θH
θL
(
PA(q(θ ,α),α)−C(q(θ ,α))
)
f (θ , αˆ)dθ
subject to
∫ θH
θL
sA(θ ,α) f (θ ,α)dθ ≥ u
where sA(θ ,α) = u(q(θ ,α),θ)−PA (q(θ ,α),α).
Any chosen quantity schedule {q(θ ,α)} has to be ex-post incentive compatible which
is equivalent to imposing the usual Envelope condition sAθ (θ ,α) = uθ (q(θ ,α),θ) and
requiring q(θ ,α) to be weakly increasing in θ .
This allows us the rewrite the constraint on consumers’ expected utility under a quantity
schedule {q(θ ,α)} as
s(θL,α)+
∫ θH
θL
uθ (q(θ ,α),θ)[1−F(θ ,α)]dθ ≥ u
Using the definition of consumer surplus to replace PA in firm A’s objective function
and integrating by parts we get
∫ θH
θL
(
PA(q(θ ,α),α)−C(q(θ ,α))
)
f (θ , αˆ)dθ =∫ θH
θL
{
u(q(θ ,α),θ)− s(θL,α)−uθ (q(θ ,α),θ)
(
1−F(θ , αˆ)
f (θ , αˆ)
)
−C(q(θ ,α))
}
f (θ , αˆ)dθ
We can now substitute the constraint on consumers’ expected utility into this expression
upon noting that in any profit maximizing solution firm A will provide consumers with
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an expected utility of exactly u.
pi(u,α) = max
{q(θ ,α)}
∫ θH
θL
ΛC (q(θ ,α),θ ,α) f (θ , αˆ)dθ −u (2.5)
where
Λc(q,θ ,α) = u(q,θ)+uθ (q,θ)
[
F(θ , αˆ)−F(θ ,α)
f (θ , αˆ)
]
−C(q) (2.6)
We get a candidate solution for the profit-maximizing schedule by maximizing the
objective function pointwise with respect to q for each θ :
q(θ ,α) = argmax
q≥0
Λc(q,θ ,α) (2.7)
If Λc is strictly quasi-concave in q, this candidate is given by the first order condition
Λcq(q(θ ,α),θ ,α) = 0 (2.8)
If furthermore Λc is supermodular in (q,θ), q(θ ,α) will be (weakly) increasing in θ
and the above candidate is indeed the profit maximizing quantity schedule.
Notice that this schedule is independent of the level of utility u provided to a customer
of type α . Differences in utility are not provided by altering the quantity schedule but
are undertaken through changes in s(θL,α), i.e. through changes in the “fixed fee”
associated with the deal.
To construct the price schedule P(·,α) that implements the profit maximizing quantity
schedule {q(θ ,α)} we can follow the usual steps. First note that
s(θL,α) = u−
∫ θH
θL
uθ (q(θ ,α),θ)dθ (2.9)
This allows us to recover the surplus function
s(θ ,α) = s(θL,α)+
∫ θH
θL
uθ (q(x,α),x)dx (2.10)
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Now from the definition of s(θ ,α) we can construct the optimal price schedule
P∗(q(θ ,α),α) = u(q(θ ,α),θ)− s(θ ,α) (2.11)
We will separate P∗ into a usage charge P(·,α) such that P(q(θL,α),α) = 0 and a fixed
fee t(u,α). This fee will adjust the value of the deal to the required utility level u.
For future reference let c(α) designate the expected cost of implementing the profit
maximizing quantity schedule net of the fixed fee, i.e.
c(α) =
∫ θH
θL
{C(q(θ ,α))−P(q(θ ,α),α)} f (θ , αˆ)dθ (2.12)
Note that for the fully rational type α = αˆ this cost is obviously zero, as the profit
maximizing price schedule equals actual costs.
Furthermore we designate by S(α) the total surplus excluding the fixed fee a customer
of type α will receive from the profit maximizing quantity schedule q(θ ,α)
S(α) =
∫ θH
θL
{u(q(θ ,α),θ)−P(q(θ ,α),α)} f (θ ,α)dθ (2.13)
2.2.2 Hotelling Competition over a Single Type
Suppose for the moment that only a single ex-ante type α is on the market. As described
above a measure one of them is distributed uniformly between the two firms A and
B. The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium of the standard Hotelling
game:
Proposition 1. Provided that τ ≤ (2/3)[S(α)− c(α)], offering the fixed fee t(α) =
τ+c(α) and the price schedule P(q,α) is an equilibrium of the above Hotelling game.
Proof. Suppose firm B offers the suggested schedule. Then firm A’s market share,
given that it offers a surplus of S ( net of travel costs ) to its customers, is
x = min
{
1
2
(
1+
S−S(α)+ τ+ c(α)
τ
)
,
S
t
}
Obviously firm A will provide the surplus level S through the profit maximizing quantity
2.2. Model Setup 23
schedule. Customers’ surplus from buying at firm A net of travel costs will then be
S(α)− k, where k is the fixed fee firm A will charge in addition to the price schedule
P(q,α).
Under the assumption that τ ≤ (2/3)[S(α)− c(α)] the market is fully covered and
profits for firm A when charging a fixed fee k are
[k− c(α)]1
2
(
1+
τ+ c(α)− k
τ
)
The fixed fee that maximizes these profits is given by k = τ + c(α) which proves the
claim.
2.2.3 Hotelling Competition with Multiple Unobservable Types
Now let us go back to the initially described setting in which the two firms face a vari-
ety of ex-ante types α , where the exact type of each customer is unknown to the firm.
A measure one of each α type is distributed uniformly between A and B.
The following proposition states that the competitive situation with multiple unobserv-
able types is separable. Offering the equilibrium derived for the single type setting to
every type α present in the market is an equilibrium of this more complex game. The
incentive constraints that ensure self-selection will turn out to be non-binding.
Proposition 2. Suppose τ ≤ (2/3)[S(α)− c(α)] for all α present in the market. Then
each firm offering a menu of contracts in which each α receives his contract from
Proposition 1 is an equilibrium.
Proof. The following proof adopts an argument from the proof of Proposition 5 in
Armstrong and Vickers [Armstrong and Vickers, 2001]. Suppose firm B offered such
a menu of contracts and that furthermore this menu was ex-ante incentive compatible
in the sense that each α would indeed choose his contract from Proposition 1. Now
suppose that firm A could actually observe the types α . This gives us an upper bound
on the profits firm A could make. Then it is a best reply for firm A to offer each type α
the contract derived in Proposition 1.
If we can show that this menu of contracts is also incentive compatible, that is that
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no type α would like to deviate to any other contract originally intended for α ′ 6= α ,
then it is also a best reply by firm A if it cannot observe the types. Ex-ante incentive
compatibility of contracts requires that
∫ θH
θL
[u(q(θ ,α),θ)−P∗(q(θ ,α),α)] f (θ ,α)dθ
≥
∫ θH
θL
[
u(q(θ ,α ′),θ)−P∗(q(θ ,α ′),α ′)] f (θ ,α)dθ
for all α ′ 6= α .
Upon substituting in t(α) = τ+ c(α) and rearranging this is equivalent to
c(α ′)− c(α)≥
∫ θH
θL
[
u(q(θ ,α ′),θ)−P(q(θ ,α ′),α ′)] f (θ ,α)dθ −S(α)
Now suppose there existed an α ′ 6=α for which this inequality would be violated. Then
the costs of moving a customer of type α from the quantity schedule q(θ ,α) to q(θ ,α ′)
would be lower than the consumer surplus (real and fictitious) created through this re-
allocation. Thus a firm could raise its profits from a type α by such a move, raising or
lowering the fixed fee in order to keep the type’s expected utility from the contract un-
altered. But this contradicts the condition that q(θ ,α) is the profit maximizing quantity
schedule for type α .
The proof shows that incentive compatibility under competition is a direct consequence
of profit maximization by firms. Furthermore the proof does not require us to impose
any structure on the set of priors. Thus Proposition 2 holds for any kind of differing
priors held by consumers in the market.
2.3 The Effects of Competition
To get an understanding of what competition can and cannot achieve in the presence
of customers with mistaken priors, I will contrast the above result to two settings.
Firstly, I will analyze the optimal tariff design of a monopolist where consumers are as
described above.
Secondly, I will analyze the case where consumers do not have mistaken priors, but
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differ in their true consumption profiles. That is for two ex-ante types α 6= α ′, we
will have F(θ ,α) 6= F(θ ,α ′), but firms and consumers have common priors. In other
words, I will analyze a competitive version of the standard Sequential Screening prob-
lem ( Armstrong [Armstrong, 1996], Courty and Li [Courty and Li, 2000] ).
Suppose that instead of having a duopoly, there is only a single firm providing the good
to customers. Customers are as described in the above setting except that I will ignore
travel costs here.
Again, the firm offers its customers a menu of price schedules {P(q, j)} j∈J before
these customers know their type θ . Customers will have ex-ante types α ∈ A , but
now in order to solve the problem, I will have to assume that the monopolist knows the
population distribution of ex-ante types G(α). Here it will furthermore be necessary to
impose more structure on the set of priors {F(θ ,α)}α∈A . While in the competitive
case, the ex-ante incentive constraints were not binding, in any profit-maximizing so-
lution of the monopolist, some ex-ante constraint will have to be binding. In order to
know which these are, I will solve the problem making two alternative assumptions on
the set of priors, Assumption 1 or alternatively Assumptions 2A and 2B.
The condition imposed under Assumption 1 is that high α types always associate a
higher probability with having a high demand in the second period than low α types.
Formally for every α ′>α , the distribution F(θ ,α ′) first order stochastically dominates
F(θ ,α).
Assumption 1. Fα(θ ,α)≤ 0 for all θ .
Under the conditions imposed by Assumption 2, the high α types will always be less
confident to accurately predict their demand in the second period than the low α type.
We will formalize this idea by imposing that for any α ′ > α , the distribution F(θ ,α ′)
is a mean preserving spread of F(θ ,α).
Assumption 3 will only be used to derive sufficient conditions for an optimum. It
implies that for all α ′ > α , F(θ ,α) < F(θ ,α ′) if θ < z, and F(θ ,α) > F(θ ,α ′) if
θ > z.
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Assumption 2.
∫ θ
θL Fα(x,α)dx≥ 0 for all θ and
∫ θH
θL Fα(x,α)dx = 0.
Assumption 3. The distribution functions F(θ ,α) cross in one and only one point
θ = z for all α .
Define Λm(q,θ ,α) as follows
Λm(q,θ ,α) = u(q,θ)+uθ (q,θ)
[
F(θ , αˆ)−F(θ ,α)
f (θ , αˆ)
]
−C(q)+uθ (q,θ)Fα(θ ,α)f (θ , αˆ)
(
1−G(α)
g(α)
)
(2.14)
The following propositions characterizes the monopolist’s profit-maximizing menu de-
sign.
Proposition 3. Suppose the set of priors {F(θ ,α)} satisfies Assumption 1. Then then
optimal quantity schedule {{q(θ ,α)}θ∈Θ}α∈A is given by
q(θ ,α) = argmax
q
Λm(q,θ ,α)
if q(θ ,α) is (weakly) increasing in both θ and α .
Proof. see Appendix
Proposition 4. Suppose the set of priors {F(θ ,α)} satisfies Assumptions 2 and 3. Then
then optimal quantity schedule {{q(θ ,α)}θ∈Θ}α∈A is given by
q(θ ,α) = argmax
q
Λm(q,θ ,α)
if q(θ ,α) is (weakly) increasing in θ , (weakly) decreasing in α on θ ≤ z, and (weakly)
increasing in α on θ > z.
Proof. see Appendix
These results allow us to compare the monopoly outcome to the menu of tariffs supplied
by firms in a duopoly with differentiated brands. We have seen that the optimal quantity
schedules {q(θ ,α)} can be derived by pointwise maximization of Λm as defined by
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(2.14) in the monopoly case, and of Λc defined by (2.6) in the duopoly case. These two
functions differ in one term
uθ (q,θ)
Fα(θ ,α)
f (θ , αˆ)
(
1−G(α)
g(α)
)
which is absent in the competitive setting. This term reflects the usual inefficiency a
monopolists creates by distorting the quantity schedules of the low α types in order to
extract more surplus from the high α types. For the highest α type this deviation from
the efficient quantity schedule disappears. As in in the standard models of competi-
tive price discrimination, this inefficiency is eliminated by competition. Firms loose
the ability to distort the quantity schedules of some ex-ante type in order to extract
more surplus from another ex-ante type. As we have seen, the competitive solution is
separable, ex-ante incentive constraints are not binding.
2.3.1 Common Priors but Different Consumption Profiles
Now, I will analyze a setting with competitive firms which face consumers with real
differences in their consumption profiles, e.g. frequent v. infrequent users. It will be
shown that in such a setting firms will not be able to use the design of their menu in
order to screen customers with different consumption profiles.
Let us return to the previous duopoly setting, but suppose that F(θ ,α) describes
the “true” consumption profile of type α . Again, there will be a heterogenous popu-
lation of α types belonging to some some set A , but firms and consumers agree that
consumption profiles are actually different. That is if a firm knew the α type of its
customer, the firm and this customer would agree that the customer’s consumption
profile is given by F(θ ,α). However, as before, α will be private information of the
consumers and if firms want to discriminate between consumers, they will have to do
so in an incentive compatible way.
Consider a firm that provides a utility level u ( net of travel costs ) to a customer
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of type α . The solution to this problem is given by
piA(u,α) = max
PA,{q(θ ,α)}
∫ θH
θL
(
PA(q(θ ,α),α)−C(q(θ ,α))
)
f (θ ,α)dθ
subject to
∫ θH
θL
sA(θ ,α) f (θ ,α)dθ ≥ u
Notice that the only difference to the situation with non-common priors is that the firm’s
expectation is taken over the same distribution as the consumer’s evaluation of the deal.
Carrying out the same steps as before we find that the firm’s profits as a function of the
type α and the provided utility level u are
pi(u,α) = max
{q(θ ,α)}
∫ θH
θL
[u(q(θ ,α),θ)−C(q(θ ,α))] f (θ ,α)dθ −u (2.15)
Now obviously the optimal quantity schedule is the efficient one, that is where marginal
utility equals marginal cost, uq(q,θ) = Cq(q). Clearly, the optimal quantity schedule
does not depend on α . The firm provides the same quantity schedule {q(θ)} to all
its customers irrespective of their type α . Furthermore, the single crossing property
uqθ > 0 ensures that q(θ) is increasing in θ and thus implementable.
The above solution is obvious. The profit-maximizing deal maximizes total surplus
and extracts any surplus that the firm wants to extract through a fixed fee ex-ante.
Let us now analyze competition by firms over ( unobservable ) types α ∈ A . The
following Proposition follows the line of argument of Proposition 5 in Armstrong and
Vickers [Armstrong and Vickers, 2001], and establishes that firms will only offer one
contract. This contract will be a fixed fee plus cost contract. Thus firms will not be
able to screen customers by the α type.
Proposition 5. Suppose τ ≤ (2/3)S(α) for all α present in the market. Then it is an
equilibrium for both firms to offer a single contract with a fixed fee equal to τ and usage
charge P(q) =C(q).
Proof. Suppose firm B offered this contract. Assume firm A could actually observe α ,
which gives us an upper bound on its profits. Then firm A’s market share, given that it
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offers a surplus of S ( net of travel costs ) to its customers, is
x = min
{
1
2
(
1+
S−S(α)+ τ
τ
)
,
S
t
}
Obviously firm A will provide the surplus level S through the profit maximizing quantity
schedule. Customers’ surplus from buying at firm A net of travel costs will then be
S(α)− k, where k is the fixed fee firm A will charge in addition to the price schedule
P(q).
Under the assumption that τ ≤ (2/3)S(α) the market is fully covered and profits for
firm A when charging a fixed fee k are
k
1
2
(
1+
τ− k
τ
)
The fixed fee that maximizes these profits is given by k= τ which proves the claim.
Thus, firms in this setting will provide all customers with the efficient quantity schedule
irrespective of their consumption profile. If we compare this outcome to the outcome
when firms compete over consumers with mistaken priors, we see that in this latter set-
tings firms do not maximize total “real” surplus when designing the quantity schedule
for type α , but total real and fictitious surplus. Fictitious surplus appears in the firm’s
design problem through an additional term in Λc
uθ (q,θ)
[
F(θ , αˆ)−F(θ ,α)
f (θ , αˆ)
]
This term reflects the disagreement between firms and customers concerning the sur-
plus provided by any given quantity schedule. When designing the optimal contract,
firms do so by providing customers with “what customers want” in a cost minimizing
way. If customers misperceive the surplus implied by a deal, even competitive firms
will not be able to correct this misperception. Firms will compete over customers by
delivering what customers want, not by delivering what firms think is best for them.
However firms will not be able to raise their profits by dealing with mistaken customers.
Firms make a profit which is equal to τ on each customer irrespective of their type α .
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All additional profits that could be made by creating fictitious surplus are competed
away. Firms do not have a comparative advantage in exploiting mistaken priors. They
only have a comparative advantage in terms of brand preferences of customers. This is
why their profit levels are linked to travel costs, i.e. the intensity of brand preferences.
Finally, note that because the competitive problem with mistaken customers is sep-
arable in the ex-ante types, the fully rational customer αˆ gets the efficient quantity
schedule. He does not suffer or enjoy any externalities from the presence of mistaken
customers in the market.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper has shown that menus of contingent contracts by competitive firms can be
understood as screening devices for customers whose beliefs differ from firms’ beliefs.
In a setting where consumers’ tastes are private information but firms and customers
agree on the value implied by any offered contract for a given value of the private in-
formation, firms facing competition will not be able to screen customers with respect
to their tastes. Here however, firms and customers can disagree about the implied value
of any given deal and this disagreement allows firms to screen customers through menu
design even if the exact reason for disagreement is private information of the customer.
It turns out that competition prevents firms from exploiting customers with mistaken be-
liefs through contract design. The profits a firm makes on a customer are independent
of the beliefs this customer holds. Also flawed evaluation of deals by some customers
does not influence the kind of deals offered to other customers. The presence of bound-
edly rational customers in the market does not exert an externality on other customers
as long as the market is sufficiently competitive.
Empirically, these results are meaningful if there are a fixed number of psychological
types present in the market. In this case this model would predict that all firms offer the
same number of contracts, which should all be identical, and each tailored towards a
specific psychological type. If this is the case, one could try to recover these types from
the shape of contracts of firms and consumption data. 5 Because of the separability
5Miravete [Miravete, 2004] shows how to recover the distribution of types in a standard non-linear
pricing problem from the shape of tariffs. In our context the shape of tariffs alone would not be enough.
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result, each contract schedule should only contain information on one specific type and
hence such an exercise is possible.
One would also need information on individual consumption to recover the true distribution of ex-post
types.
Chapter 3
Financial Transaction Taxes and the
Informational Efficiency of Financial
Markets: A Structural Estimation
3.1 Introduction
In August 2012 France introduced a financial transaction tax. Anyone buying shares of
companies with market value exceedinge1 billion incurs a 0.2 percent tax on the value
of the transaction. A similar tax was introduced in Italy in March 2013. A proposal by
the European Council for the introduction of a 0.1 percent ad valorem transaction tax
for the entire European Union by 2014 (later postponed to 2016) has been favoured by
countries like Austria, France, Germany, Italy and Spain, and opposed by others, like
Sweden and the UK. Proposals to introduce the tax have also been advanced in many
other countries, especially after the 2007-8 financial crisis.
Of course, transaction taxes are not a recent discovery. They have been implemented in
several countries, like Sweden, US and UK during the past decades. The resurgence of
a vibrant debate on the optimality of transaction taxes, triggered by the recent financial
crisis, has seen many proposers of the tax blaming financial markets, and in particular,
financial speculation, for systemic risk. In this view, the tax would reduce excessive
trading and volatility, and perhaps lower the probability of further crises. Opponents of
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the tax, instead, argue that it would only lower market efficiency.
In this paper we propose a novel methodology to study the impact of a transaction tax
on informational efficiency, liquidity and volatility. In a market microstucture frame-
work, we analyze the process of price formation. Informed traders interact with noise
traders, who provide liquidity to the market. Their trading activity reveals information
that may be aggregated by the price. The question we ask is how the introduction of
a tax affects market participation and decisions by these two classes of traders. It is
clear that if the tax discouraged all informed traders from participating in the market,
the price would stop aggregating information. On the other hand, if it only discouraged
the participation of traders with very imprecise private information, the market could
actually become more efficient. The way in which the tax affects the decisions of noise
traders can also have ambivalent effects. Less noise traders in the market may make
the trading flow more informative; on the other hand, lower liquidity may also make
trading more costly for informed traders, and lower informational efficiency.
Similar considerations hold for price volatility. While one would like to avoid ex-
cess price volatility, we know that prices may be volatile because of informed traders’
activity. Whether the tax reduces “good” or “bad” volatility again depends on the effect
that it has on informed and noise traders’ decisions and on their interaction.
The difficulty of identifying the effect of the taxes on different categories of traders
has been one of the major problems in evaluating the impact of transaction taxes (see,
e.g., Habermeier and Kirilenko [Habermeier and Kirilenko, 2001]). To identify these
effects, we build a model with informed traders (who receive a private signal on the fun-
damental asset value) and noise traders (both price inelastic and price elastic). Through
maximum likelihood, we estimate the proportion of these three groups of traders, as
well as the precision of the private signals received by informed traders. Once we
have obtained our estimates, we use them to simulate the model in the presence of a
transaction tax. We compare trading decisions, bid and ask spreads and price levels in
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the estimated and the simulated model, thus being able to disentangle and to quantify
the effects of the tax.
Since the main aim of this paper is methodological, we estimate our model using
high frequency data for only one stock traded in the NYSE. We find that in our asset
market a transaction tax would mostly affect traders who trade on private information.
Traders who trade for liquidity reasons are price inelastic and therefore, do not change
their demand in response to a transaction tax. A transaction tax would only crowd out
some informed trading and thus reduce the informational content of the order flow. In
our asset market even moderate taxes in the suggested range for a financial transaction
tax, namely 0.5 percent on the value of the transaction, would completely crowd out
informed trade and thus destroy the market’s ability to aggregate information. A 0.2
percent tax on transactions as implemented in France would lead to a 10 percent drop
in volume in our asset market. We find an ambiguous effect of the tax on spreads as
on the one hand the reduction of informed trading leads to narrower spreads (market
makers need less protection against traders with superior information), but, on the other
hand, private information is revealed less quickly and asymmetric information in the
market persists for longer than in the absence of a tax.
There is a large academic debate on the transaction tax. A paper that studies the impact
of the tax on informational efficiency and volatility in a market microstucture frame-
work is the recent paper by Rosenthal and Thomas [Rosenthal and Thomas, 2012].
They consider a model in which traders strategically submit limit and market orders.
Their analysis shows that the transaction tax widens the spread, increases volatility
and lowers gains from trade. Dupont and Lee [Dupont and Lee, 2007] consider a
quote driven market, building on Glosten and Milgrom [Glosten and Milgrom, 1985].
For tractability, however, they limit the analysis to a static, one period model. They
show that the effect of the tax on the bid-ask spread depends on the level of asym-
metric information in the market. Other papers related to ours are Mannaro et al.
[Mannaro et al., 2008] and Pellizzari and Westerhoff [Pellizzari and Westerhoff, 2009].
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Their analysis is very different from ours, in that they use heterogenous agents mod-
els. In common with us, they are interested in studying the effect of the transaction
tax on different groups of traders (who use technical and fundamental trading rules).
They both find that transaction taxes may hamper market liquidity, although less so
in the presence of a specialist. The effect of the transaction tax on price volatility has
also been studied in a general equilibrium competitive economy by Song and Zhang
[Song and Zhang, 2005]. In common with our work, they are also interested in the
response of different classes of traders to the tax. They show that a transaction tax may
lower volatility, by discouraging noise traders to trade, but can also have the opposite
effect, since in a less liquid market the price impact of a trade can be higher. The result
that volatility may increase with a tax was also shown in earlier theoretical work by
Kupiec [Kupiec, 1996].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and 3 describe the theo-
retical model without tax. Section 4 introduces a financial transaction tax into the
theoretical model. Section 5 then presents the likelihood function and section 6 de-
scribes the data used to estimate the structural model through maximum likelihood.
Section 7 presents estimates for the parameters of our structural model. Section 8
reports simulations quantifying the impact of a financial transaction tax on our asset
market. Finally section 9 concludes. An appendix contains further estimation results
and other supplementary material.
3.2 The Model
Building on Easley et al. [Easley et al., 1997] we consider an asset that is traded by
a sequence of traders who interact with a market maker. Trading days are indexed by
d = 1,2,3, .... Time within each day is discrete and indexed by t = 1,2,3, ....
The asset
We denote the fundamental value of the asset on day d by V d . The asset value does
not change during the day, but can change from one day to the next. At the beginning
of the day, with probability 1−α the asset value remains the same as on the previous
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day (V d = vd−1), and with probability α it changes. On each day d, the value of
the asset on the previous day d− 1, vd−1, is known to all market participants.1 As
we will explain, when the value of the asset changes from one day to the other, there
are informed traders in the market; for this reason, we say that an information event
has occurred. If an information event occurs, with probability 1− δ the asset value
decreases to vd−1−λL (bad informational event), and with probability δ it increases to
vd−1+λH (good informational event), where λL > 0 and λH > 0. Informational events
are independently distributed over the days of trading. To simplify the notation, we
define vdH := v
d−1+λH and vdL := v
d−1−λL. Finally, we assume that (1−δ )λL = δλH ,
which, as will become clear later, guarantees that the closing price is a martingale.
The market
The asset is exchanged in a specialist market. Its price is set by a market maker who
interacts with a sequence of traders. At any time t = 1,2,3, ... during the day a trader is
randomly chosen to act and can buy, sell, or decide not to trade. Each trade consists of
the exchange of one unit of the asset for cash. The trader’s action space is, therefore,
A = {buy,sell,no trade}. We denote the action of the trader at time t on day d byXdt
and the history of trades and prices until time t−1 of day d by hdt .
The market maker
At any time t of day d, the market maker sets the prices at which a trader can buy or
sell the asset. When posting these prices, the market maker must take into account the
possibility of trading with traders who (as we shall see) have some private information
on the asset value. He will set different prices for buying and for selling, that is, there
will be a bid-ask spread. We denote the ask price (the price at which a trader can buy)
at time t by adt and the bid price (the price at which a trader can sell) by b
d
t .
Due to (unmodeled) potential competition, the market maker makes zero expected
profits. This implies that he sets the ask and bid prices equal to the expected value of
1For more comments on this point, see footnote 18. Note that vd−1 is the realization of the ran-
dom variable V d−1. Throughout the text, we will denote random variables with capital letters and their
realizations with lowercase letters.
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the asset conditional on the information available at time t and on the chosen action.
Moreover, due to potential competition, the ask is the smallest value satisfying this
condition for a buy and the bid the highest value satisfying this condition for a sell, that
is,
adt = mina
{
a : a−E(V |Xdt = buy,a,hdt ) = 0
}
and
bdt = max
b
{
b : E(V |Xdt = sell,b,hdt )−b = 0
}
.
We will sometimes refer to the market maker’s expectation conditional on the history
of trades only as the “price” of the asset, and we will denote it by pdt = E(V d|hdt ) .2
The traders
There are a countable number of traders. Traders act in an exogenous sequential order.
Each trader is chosen to take an action only once, at time t of day d. Traders are of two
types, informed and noise. The trader’s own type is private information.
On no event days, all traders in the market are noise traders. On information event
days, at any time t an informed trader is chosen to trade with probability µ and a noise
trader with probability 1−µ , with µ ∈ (0,1).3
Informed traders have private information about the asset value. They receive a private
signal on the new asset value and observe the previous history of trades and prices, and
the current prices.4
2Standard arguments show that bdt ≤ pdt ≤ adt (see Glosten and Milgrom
[Glosten and Milgrom, 1985]).
3In other words, µ should be interpreted as the proportion of informed-based trading decisions in a
day (and not as the proportion of informed traders in the population). Of course, in a no-event day, the
proportion of informed-based trading decisions is zero.
4As we will explain later, in the model there is a one-to-one mapping from trades to prices. For this
reason, in bringing the model to the data, we only need to assume that traders observe the history of past
prices.
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Figure 3.1: Density of Signal. The figure shows the signal’s value-contingent density functions
for different values τ
The private signal Sdt has the following value-contingent densities:
f H(sdt |V d = vdH) = 1+ τ(2sdt −1),
f L(sdt |V d = vdL) = 1− τ(2sdt −1),
with τ ∈ (0,∞). (See Figure 3.1).
For τ ∈ (0,1], the support of the densities is [0,1]. In contrast, for τ > 1, the
support shrinks to [ τ−12τ ,
τ−1+2√τ
2τ ] for f
H(·|vdH) and to [ τ+1−2
√
τ
2τ ,
τ+1
2τ ] for f
L(·|vdL)
(in order for the density functions to integrate to one). Note that, given the value
of the asset, the signals Sdt are i.i.d.
5 The signals satisfy the monotone likeli-
hood ratio property. At each time t, the likelihood ratio after receiving the signal,
P(V d=vdH |hdt ,sdt )
P(V d=vdL|hdt ,sdt )
=
1+τ(2sdt −1)
1−τ(2sdt −1)
P(V d=vdH |hdt )
P(V d=vdL|hdt )
, is higher than that before receiving the signal if
sdt > 0.5 and lower if s
d
t < 0.5. For this reason we refer to a signal larger than 0.5 as a
“good signal” and to a signal smaller than 0.5 as a “bad signal.”
The parameter τ measures the informativeness of the signals. When τ → 0, the den-
5Conditional i.i.d. signals deliver a likelihood function that can be easily brought to the data. Never-
theless, the result that herding arises in equilibrium would also hold in an economy in which signals are
not conditionally independent.
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sities are uniform and the signals are completely uninformative. As τ increases, the
signals become more and more informative. For any given τ ∈ (0,1), the support of
the distribution of the likelihood ratio is bounded away from 0 and infinity, while for
τ ≥ 1 it is not. Following Smith and Sørensen [Smith and Sorensen, 2000], in the first
case we say that beliefs are bounded and in the second case that they are unbounded.
With bounded beliefs, no signal realizations (even the most extreme ones) reveal the
asset value with probability one. With unbounded beliefs, in contrast, some high (low)
signal realizations are possible only when the asset value is high (low), and therefore
the signal can be perfectly informative.6 As τ tends to infinity, the measure of perfectly
informative signals tends to one.
An informed trader knows that an information event has occurred and that, as a re-
sult, the asset value has changed with respect to the previous day. Moreover, his signal
is informative on whether the event is good or bad. Nevertheless, according to the
signal realization that he receives and the precision τ , he may not be completely sure
of the effect of the event on the asset value. For instance, he may know that there has
been a change in the investment strategy of a company, but not be sure whether this
change will affect the asset value in a positive or negative way. The parameter τ can
be interpreted as measuring the precision of the information that the trader receives, or
the ability of the trader to process such private information. Finally, note that, given
our signal structure, informed traders are heterogenous, since they receive signal real-
izations with different degrees of informativeness about the asset’s fundamental value.
In addition to capturing heterogeneity of information in the market, a linear den-
sity function for the signal makes it possible to compute the traders’ strategies and the
market maker’s posted prices analytically. As a result, we obtain a simple and tractable
likelihood function. Moreover, in contrast to other specifications such as a discrete
signal (e.g., a noisy binary signal), our choice avoids creating a discontinuity in the
6In particular, any signal greater than or equal to τ+12τ reveals that the asset value is v
H
d , whereas a
signal lower than or equal to τ−12τ reveals that the asset value is v
L
d .
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likelihood function, which would make estimation problematic.
An informed trader’s payoff function, U : {vdL,vdH}×A × [vdL,vdH ]2→R+, is defined as
U(vd,Xdt ,a
d
t ,b
d
t ) =

vd−adt if Xdt = buy
0 if Xdt = no trade
bdt − vd if Xdt = sell
An informed trader chooses Xdt to maximize E
[
U(V d,Xdt ,a
d
t ,b
d
t )|hdt ,sdt
]
(i.e., he is risk
neutral). Therefore, he finds it optimal to buy whenever E(V d|hdt ,sdt )> adt and to sell
whenever E(V d|hdt ,sdt ) < bdt . He chooses not to trade when bdt < E(V d|hdt ,sdt ) < adt .
Otherwise, he is indifferent between buying and not trading, or selling and not trading.
Noise traders trade for unmodeled reasons, such as liquidity or hedging needs. A
fraction 1−ψ of them are price inelastic: they buy with probability ε2 , sell with prob-
ability ε2 and do not trade with probability 1− ε (with 0 < ε < 1). In other words,
if a price inelastic noise trader is drawn to trade at time t, and he is willing to buy
(which will occur with probability ε2 ), he will do so independently of the posted quotes.
The remaining fraction ψ is, instead, price elastic: their decision to buy, sell or not to
trade does depend on the ask and bid prices. Specifically, each of these noise traders
receives a shock Ndt , with shocks distributed independently across time according to
the uniform distribution on the interval [0,1]. Upon receiving a shock ndt , a price elastic
noise trader’s valuation of the asset at time t of day d is E
(
V d|hdt ,ndt
)
. This expectation
is computed as if the shock (which is actually distributed independently of the asset
value) were distributed on [0,1] according to the following value-contingent densities:
gH(ndt |V d = vdH) = 2ndt ,
g = (sdt |V d = vd−1) = 1,
gL(sdt |V d = vdL) = 2(1−ndt ).
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Essentially, noise traders can be thought of as traders who, in addition to the common
value V d , have a private value from holding the asset. Whereas price inelastic noise
traders have a private value so large that they are forced to buy or sell independently
of the price (e.g., because they receive a liquidity shock), price elastic noise traders
have smaller private values that make them inclined to buy, to sell or not to trade.
The specific modeling of the price elastic noise traders that we have chosen has some
useful features. First, it guarantees that the noise trader’s valuation of the asset is always
(strictly) between vdL and v
d
H , so that at any time t these noise traders’ demand is, indeed,
always price elastic.7 Second, our choice has the convenient property that by modeling
both informed and noise traders in a similar fashion we are able to solve our model
analytically. Finally, note that while the shock affects the trader’s asset valuation in
a time-varying fashion, the expectation at time t of the trader’s valuation at time t +
1 is E
(
Vd|hdt
)
, that is, the noise trader’s valuation respects the martingale property.
This way of modelling noise traders was first proposed by Glosten [Glosten, 2009].
One interpretation he offers is that noise traders are boundedly rational agents wrongly
attributing information to uninformative signals.
3.3 Equilibrium Analysis
At each time t, the trading decision of an informed trader can simply be characterized
by two thresholds, σdt and β dt , satisfying the equalities
E
[
V d|hdt ,σdt
]
= bdt (3.1)
and
E
[
V d|hdt ,β dt
]
= adt . (3.2)
An informed trader will sell for any signal realization smaller than σdt and buy for any
signal realization greater than β dt . Obviously, the thresholds at each time t depend on
7This would not be the case if, for instance, we had modeled the noise traders as valuing the asset
E
(
V d |hdt
)
+ ρt or ρt E
(
V d |hdt
)
, where ρt would represent an i.i.d. additive or multiplicative private
component. In such cases, even if we chose the support of ρt such that at time 1 of each day the noise
traders’ demand would be price elastic, still, it would become price inelastic as E
(
V d |hdt
)
converges to
the the extremes of the support.
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informed sell informed buy
Figure 3.2: Informed trader’s decision. The figure illustrates the signal realizations for which
an informed trader decides to buy or sell when V d = vdh .
the history of trades until that time and on the parameter values.8
Figure 3.2 (drawn for the case of a good informational event) illustrates the decision
of informed traders. An informed trader buys the asset with a signal higher than the
threshold value β dt , sells it with a signal lower than σdt , and does not trade otherwise.
The measure of informed traders buying or selling is equal to the areas (labeled as
“informed buy” and “informed sell”) below the line representing the signal density
function.
A similar analysis holds for price elastic noise traders. At each trading time t on
day d their behavior can be characterized by a buy threshold κdt and a sell threshold γdt .
The buy threshold κdt for a noise trader is implicitly given by
E
(
V d|hdt ,κdt
)
= adt (3.3)
8Since noise traders buy and sell with probabilities bounded away from zero, standard argu-
ments prove that the bid and ask prices exist and are unique (see, e.g., Cipriani and Guarino
[Cipriani and Guarino, 2008]). Similar arguments can be used to prove existence and uniqueness of
the thresholds (see Cipriani and Guarino [Cipriani and Guarino, 2014]).
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price elastic noise sell price elastic noise buy
Figure 3.3: Price elastic noise trader’s decision. The figure illustrates the shock realization for
which a price elastic noise trader decides to buy or sell.
and the sell threshold γdt by
E
(
V d|hdt ,γdt
)
= bdt . (3.4)
Figure 3.3 illustrates the resulting trading probabilities for price elastic noise traders.
Notice that since the private value shocks Ndt are drawn from a uniform distribution
on [0,1] irrespective of the type of event day, these probabilities only depend on the
thresholds γdt and κdt but not on the realization of V d unlike in the case of the informed
traders.
Let us now derive the equilibrium buy thresholds. Obviously, (3.2) and (3.3) together
imply that
E
(
V d|hdt ,κdt
)
= E
(
V d|hdt ,β dt
)
, (3.5)
from which one can derive a linear relationship between the two thresholds,
κdt = c0(h
d
t )+ c1(h
d
t )β
d
t , (3.6)
where c0(hdt ) and c1(h
d
t ) are functions of the history h
d
t only.
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As we know, the ask price has to yield zero expected profits to the market maker,
given his beliefs upon observing a buy order. It is thus given by the following expres-
sion:
adt = v
d−1+Pr
(
vdH |buydt ,hdt ,adt ,bdt
)
λH−Pr
(
vdL|buydt ,hdt ,adt ,bdt
)
λL, (3.7)
where the probabilities of a good and bad event will be functions of the thresholds β dt
and κdt . By (3.6) we can express κdt as a function of β dt .
Similarly, the expectation of an informed trader with signal β dt can be expressed
as
E
(
V d|hdt ,β dt
)
= vd−1+Pr
(
vdH |hdt ,β dt
)
λH−Pr
(
vdL|hdt ,β dt
)
λL. (3.8)
After substituting (3.6) into (3.7) and then both (3.7) and (3.8) into (3.2), one obtains
a quadratic equation in β dt . This solution corresponds to the smallest equilibrium ask
price that is consistent with zero expected profits for the market maker. The threshold
β dt is then the smallest solution of the quadratic equation for the buy threshold such that
β dt ∈ [0,1]. An analogous approach yields a quadratic equation for the equilibrium sell
thresholds σdt ; σdt is the largest solution in the interval [0,1], that is, it corresponds to
the largest equilibrium bid price that is consistent with zero expected profits.9 Once we
have solved for β dt and σdt we can obtain the buy and sell thresholds for the price elastic
noise traders, κdt and γdt , which are functions of the informed traders’ thresholds.
3.4 The Financial Transaction Tax
We now consider the introduction of a transaction tax into the market. Whenever
a trader buys or sells the asset, he has to pay a tax ρ . Therefore, if he buys, he
pays adt + ρ , and if he sells, he receives bdt − ρ . As a result, an informed trader
with signal sdt finds it optimal to buy when E
(
V d|hdt ,sdt
)
> adt + ρ , and to sell when
E
(
V d|hdt ,sdt
)
< bdt −ρ; he chooses not to trade when bdt −ρ < E
(
V d|hdt ,sdt
)
< adt +ρ ,
9The nature of the solutions guarantees that the equilibrium sell threshold is smaller than the equilib-
rium buy threshold, that is, σdt ≤ β dt .
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and is indifferent between trading and not when an equality holds. Similarly, a price
elastic noise trader with private value shock ndt buys if E
(
V d|hdt ,ndt
)
> adt +ρ , sells if
E
(
V d|hdt ,ndt
)
< bdt −ρ , chooses not to trade if bdt −ρ < E
(
V d|hdt ,ndt
)
< adt +ρ and is
indifferent between two actions if an equality holds.
Even in the presence of a tax, the equilibrium can still be characterized in terms of
buy and sell thresholds for informed traders and price elastic noise traders. Of course,
such thresholds will differ from those of the case without tax, since the introduction
of a transaction tax can make trading unprofitable for some informed and noise traders
who would have traded without a tax. Specifically, the buy thresholds for informed
and price elastic noise traders are now implicitly given by the following system of
equations
E
(
V d|hdt ,β dt
)
= adt +ρ ,
E
(
V d|hdt ,κdt
)
= adt +ρ .
Note that from this system one can immediately derive (3.5) and (3.6), as in the previous
analysis. After equating E
(
V d|hdt ,β dt
)
to the ask price and after some manipulations,
one obtains
Pr
(
vdH |hdt ,β dt
)
−Pr
(
vdH |hdt ,buydt
)
− ρ
λH
=
(
δ
1−δ
)[
Pr
(
vdL|hdt ,β dt
)
−Pr
(
vdL|hdt ,buydt
)]
, (3.9)
which turns out to be a cubic equation in β dt ; its smallest root in [0,1] gives the equilib-
rium buy threshold for informed traders. From this and (3.6) it is immediate to obtain
the equilibrium buy threshold for the price elastic noise trader. An identical analysis
finds the equilibrium sell thresholds.
From this analysis we derive two conclusions: informed traders who receive less
informative signals and price elastic noise traders who receive weaker shocks may
3.4. The Financial Transaction Tax 46
find it optimal to abstain from trade to avoid paying the tax; at the same time, the tax
changes the equilibrium bid and ask prices, since the measure of informed and noise
traders on both sides of the market may be different.
This model, as any Glosten and Milgrom [Glosten and Milgrom, 1985] type of model,
is not ideal to derive analytical results about comparative statics. This is not an issue for
us, since we are interested in quantifying the effects of the tax, rather than proposing
a new theoretical analysis. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight the main forces
at work. The transaction tax can affect the informational efficiency of the market in
different ways. To see this, consider a simple example. Suppose in the absence of the
tax at time 1 in equilibrium, informed traders would buy for a signal greater than 0.55,
sell for a signal lower than 0.45, and would not trade otherwise. Furthermore, suppose
that, instead, in the presence of the tax, in equilibrium, they would buy for a signal
greater than 0.6, sell for a signal lower than 0.4, and would not trade otherwise. In this
example, a signal of 0.57 would be (partially) revealed in the absence of the tax, but
not in its presence. Indeed, without the tax, the informed trader receiving such a signal
would buy and the market maker would update the prices up. With the tax, instead,
the trader would not trade and the market maker would be unable to infer whether the
informed trader potentially trading at that time received a good or bad signal. All this
suggests that the tax may lower the informational efficiency. On the other hand, note
that in the presence of the tax, the buy order may become more informative, in that
informed traders buy only after receiving stronger signals (a signal higher than 0.6, in
our example). One can find parameter values for which the first effect is dominant,
and others for which the second effect is. Note also that in our example, because of
the symmetry, a no trade is completely uninformative about the type of (good or bad)
signal that an informed trader received. There may be cases in which, even in the
presence of the tax, the no trade does reveal information about the signal, since it is
chosen for a different measure of good and bad signals. In that case, the tax, although
creating a disincentive for traders to participate in the market for some signals, does not
prevent these signals to be partially learned in the market; they are revealed, although
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obviously in a noisy way, by the no trade decisions. When we consider times greater
than 1, there may be an additional effect. As we know (e.g. Cipriani and Guarino
[Cipriani and Guarino, 2014]) informed traders may herd in the market. In periods of
herding, informational efficiency is lowered. The transaction tax lowers the incentive
of traders to herd, since they may find it optimal not to trade with a specific signal,
rather than herding. This is an extra channel through which the transaction tax can be
beneficial for informational efficiency.
All this analysis concerns informed traders. As we explained above, the transaction tax
also affects noise traders, who can find it optimal not to trade if they have to pay a tax.
This can increase the informativeness of trades, since they may now be more likely to
come from informed traders. At the same time, the lower liquidity in the market can
enlarge the bid-ask spread, which in turn can affect information aggregation negatively.
It is important to observe that this analysis holds for time t when the tax is intro-
duced at that time. For future times, the effects of a tax on the informativeness of trades
(and on the spread) are even more ambiguous. More informative trades at time t may
mean a larger spread at that time. On the other hand, they also imply faster learning,
which may mean a lower expected spread (and more informative trades) at future times.
Overall, this analysis shows that a transaction tax affects informational efficiency
in various ways, and the net effect is, a priori, ambiguous. What is not ambigu-
ous is the asymptotic effect of the tax. We know that in the absence of a tax, the
price converges almost surely to the true asset value (see, e.g., Avery and Zemsky
[Avery and Zemsky, 1998]). If informed traders have bounded beliefs, this conver-
gence result does not hold when a tax is introduced. In the presence of a tax, asymp-
totically, as t goes to infinity, all informed traders will stop trading. When they do so,
trading becomes completely uninformative on which of the two (good or bad) events
has occurred. Eventually, the market maker will stop updating the price. In the social
learning literature such a situation is referred to as an informational cascade, a concept
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that we now define formally:
Definition 1. An informational cascade arises at time t of day d when
Pr(V d = vdH |hdt ,Xdt = x) = Pr(V d = vdH |hdt ),
for all x ∈ {buy,sell,no trade}.
The next proposition states our result formally:
Proposition 6. In equilibrium, as t → ∞, on an event day an informational cascade
arises almost surely if and only if beliefs are bounded (i.e., τ < 1). In the cascade, all
informed traders decide not to trade; that is, for almost all histories there exists a time
T , such that, for any t > T ,
Pr(Xdt = no trade|sdt ,hdt ) = 1,
for any signal realization sdt .
Proof. See Cipriani and Guarino [Cipriani and Guarino, 2008], Proposition 2.
Over time, as the price aggregates private information, the informational content of a
given signal becomes relatively less important than that of the history of trades. After
a long enough sequence of trades, the valuations of the traders (for any possible signal)
become so close to the bid and ask prices that the expected gain from acting upon
private information becomes smaller than the tax. At this point, an informed trader
prefers not to trade independently of the signal, and an informational cascade arises.
A cascade only happens when the informed traders’ belief that Vd = vHd has reached .
The following proposition makes this statement more precise by deriving limits for be-
liefs qdt = Pr(V
d = vdh|V d 6= vd−1,hdt ) such that as long as those limits are not reached,
informed traders will continue to trade and private information will continue to be
aggregated by prices:
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Proposition 7. If ρ <
(
2τδ
1−τ|2δ−1|
)
λh, on an event day an informational cascade occurs
only if Pr(V d = vdh|hdt ) has reached either an lower threshold r∗ or an upper threshold
1− r∗, where r∗ is the smallest root of the quadratic equation
2(1− r)pτ
1− (2r−1)τ = (1−δ )
ρ
λh
.
The root r is increasing in the transaction tax ρ and decreasing in τ,δ , and λh.
If ρ >
(
2τδ
1−τ|2δ−1|
)
λh, on an event day, informed traders never trade for all t. The
probability of a good event converges almost surely to Pr(V d = vdh|hdt ) = δ .
Proof. See Appendix.
Of course, in our dataset the number of trades is finite, therefore there is no guarantee
that a cascade occurs on a given day. We will come back to this point when studying
the effect of the transaction tax on informational efficiency. To reach this aim, we need
first to estimate the structural parameters of our model. To do so we now derive the
likelihood function of the model.
3.5 The Likelihood Function
Since we use data for stocks that could be traded without paying a tax, we aim to
estimate the parameters of the model without a financial transaction tax. We have
characterized equilibrium behavior of market participants for all possible histories of
trades. Therefore, we can write the likelihood function for the history of trades only,
disregarding bid and ask prices. 10
Let us denote the history of trades at the end of a trading day by hd := hdTd , where
10The likelihood function is a function of trades only and does not depend on bid and ask prices.
Bid and ask prices in our model are uniquely determined by the trade sequence and thus do not contain
any additional information once we condition on the order flow. This would not be true if in addition
to private information, public information was revealed during a trading day. Our likelihood function
however would still be valid, as the probability of trade by any type of trader and after any given history
of trades would not be affected by the arrival of public information given our specification of informed
and noise trader demand.
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Td is the number of trading times on day d. We denote the likelihood function by
L (Φ;{hd}Dd=1) = Pr
(
{hd}Dd=1|Φ
)
where Φ := {α,δ ,µ,τ,ψ,ε} is the vector of parameters.
Next recall that on day d all market participants know vd−1 and the occurrence of
information events is independent across days. Thus the sequence of trades on day d
only depends on the realization of V d and not on any trading data from days other than
d. We can therefore write the likelihood function as the product of the likelihoods of
daily trading sequences
L (Φ;{hd}Dd=1) = Pr
(
{hd}Dd=1|Φ
)
=ΠDd=1 Pr(h
d|Φ).
Now consider the likelihood of a sequence of trades for a given day. Unlike in the
standard market microstructure model of Easley et al. [Easley et al., 1997] where only
the total number of buys and sells matter for the probability of a given history of trades,
in our model the sequence of trades is important. Informed and price elastic traders
update their valuations depending on the trading sequence and thus their probability of
trading depends on the observed history of trades up to the time in which they act. We
have, therefore, to characterize the likelihood function for the history of trades on day
d starting at time 1 and then working in a recursive way up to time Td . At trading time
t the probability of a given action xdt depends on the sequence of previous trades h
d
t and
we have that
Pr
(
hdt+1|Φ
)
=Πts=1 Pr
(
xds |hds ,Φ
)
= Pr(xdt |hdt ,Φ) Pr
(
hdt |Φ
)
. (3.10)
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To compute Pr
(
xdt |hdt ,Φ
)
, we express it in terms of the value-contingent trading prob-
abilities
Pr
(
xdt |hdt ,Φ
)
= Pr
(
xdt |hdt ,vdH ,Φ
)
Pr
(
vdH |hdt ,Φ
)
+
Pr
(
xdt |hdt ,vdL,Φ
)
Pr
(
vdL|hdt ,Φ
)
+Pr
(
xdt |hdt ,vd−1,Φ
)
Pr
(
vd−1|hdt ,Φ
)
.
We now illustrate how to compute the value-contingent probabilities of a trade xdt . Con-
sider period t = 1 and suppose, for instance, that there has been a buy order, xd1 = buy.
The probability of such an order for a given asset value depends on the buy thresholds
for informed and price elastic noise traders, β d1 and κ
d
1 , which are functions of the
market maker’s prior beliefs α and δ and of the other parameters. Having obtained the
value-contingent probabilities of a buy order in period 1, we can then update the mar-
ket makers’ beliefs concerning the asset value V d using Bayes’ rule. Hence, consider
period t and suppose again that xdt is a buy order. The equilibrium buy thresholds, β dt
and κdt , will be functions of the market maker’s beliefs given the trading history up to
(but not including) period t as well as the parameters of the model.
Once we have solved for β dt and κdt , we can compute the probability of a buy or-
der on a good event day as follows:
Pr
(
xdt = buy|hdt ,vdH ,Φ
)
=
µ
[
1−FH
(
β dt |vdH
)]
+(1−µ)
[
ψ
(
1−κdt
)
+(1−ψ)
(ε
2
)]
,
where FH(·|vdH) is the cumulative distribution function of f H(·|vdH). Recall that a trader
active at time t is an informed trader with probability µ and a noise trader with proba-
bility 1−µ . An informed trader buys if his signal is above the buy threshold β dt which
happens with probability 1−FH(β dt |vdH). With probability 1−ψ a noise trader is price
inelastic, in which case he buys with probability ε/2. A price elastic noise trader, in
turn, buys if his shock is larger than κdt , which happens with probability 1−κdt as these
shocks are uniformly distributed.
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Similarly, on a bad event day we have that
Pr
(
xdt = buy|hdt ,vdL,Φ
)
=
µ
[
1−FL
(
β dt |vdL
)]
+(1−µ)
[
ψ
(
1−κdt
)
+(1−ψ)
(ε
2
)]
.
Finally, in a no event day (V d = vd−1) a market order can only come from a noise
trader with either elastic demand (a fraction ψ of traders) or inelastic demand (1−ψ).
Therefore, for a buy order we have that
Pr
(
xdt = buy|hdt ,vd−1,Φ
)
= ψ
(
1−κdt
)
+(1−ψ)ε
2
.
By following an analogous procedure we obtain the value-contingent probabilities for
a sell order at t by computing σdt and γdt . The probability of a sell order on a good event
day, for instance, is
Pr
(
xdt = sell|hdt ,vdH ,Φ
)
=
µFH
(
σdt |vdH
)
+(1−µ)
[
ψγdt +(1−ψ)
(ε
2
)]
;
the probability of a no-trade is just the complement to the probabilities of a buy and of
a sell.
Finally, to compute Pr
(
xdt |hdt ,Φ
)
, we need the conditional probabilities of V d given the
history until time t, that is, Pr
(
V d = v|hdt ,Φ
)
for v ∈ {vdL,vd−1,vdH}. These can also be
computed recursively by using Bayes’s rule.
3.6 Data
Given that the purpose of this work is methodological, we perform our empirical anal-
ysis on one stock only, Ashland Inc., traded on the New York Stock Exchange and
already used in the seminal paper by Easley et al. [Easley et al., 1997].
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We obtained the data from the TAQ (Trades and Quotes) dataset.11 The dataset con-
tains the posted bid and ask prices (the “quotes”), the prices at which the transactions
occurred (the “trades”), and the time when the quotes were posted and when the trans-
actions occurred. We used transactions data on Ashland Inc. in 1995, for a total of 252
trading days. The data refer to trading on the New York Stock Exchange, the American
Stock Exchanges, and the consolidated regional exchanges.
The TAQ dataset does not sign the trades, that is, it does not report whether a transac-
tion was a sale or a purchase. To classify a trade as a sell or a buy order, we used the
standard algorithm proposed by Lee and Ready [Lee and Ready, 1991]. We compared
the transaction price with the quotes that were posted just before a trade occurred.12
Every trade above the midpoint was classified as a buy order, and every trade below
the midpoint was classified as a sell order; trades at the midpoint were classified as
buy or sell orders according to whether the transaction price had increased (uptick) or
decreased (downtick) with respect to the previous one. If there was no change in the
transaction price, we looked at the previous price movement, and so on.13
TAQ data do not contain any direct information on no-trades. We used the established
convention of inserting no-trades between two transactions if the elapsed time between
them exceeded a particular time interval (see, e.g., Easley et al. [Easley et al., 1997]).
We obtained this interval by computing the ratio between the total trading time in a day
and the average number of buy and sell trades over the 252 days (see, e.g., Chung et al.
[Chung et al., 2005] ). In our 252 trading-day window, the average number of trades
per day was 90.2. We divided the total daily trading time (390 minutes) by 90.2 and
obtained a unit-time interval of 259 seconds (i.e., on average, a trade occurred every
259 seconds). If there was no trading activity for 259 seconds or more, we inserted
11Hasbrouck [Hasbrouck, 2004] provides a detailed description of this dataset.
12Given that transaction prices are reported with a delay, we followed Leee and Ready’s
[Lee and Ready, 1991] suggestion of moving each quote ahead in time by five seconds. Moreover, fol-
lowing Hasbrouck [Hasbrouck, 1991], we ignore quotes posted by the regional exchanges.
13We classified all trades with the exception of the opening trades, since these trades result from a
trading mechanism (an auction) substantially different from the mechanism of trading during the day
(which is the focus of our analysis).
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one or more no-trades to the sequence of buy and sell orders. The number of no-trades
that we inserted between two consecutive transactions was equal to the number of
259-second time intervals between them.
Our sample of 252 trading days contained on average 149 decisions (buy, sell, or
no-trade) per day. The sample was balanced, with 30 percent of buys, 31 percent of
sells, and 40 percent of no-trades.
Finally, remember that in our theoretical model we assume that the closing price is
a martingale. For the case of Ashland Inc. during 1995, the data support the hypothesis
that the closing price is a martingale with respect to the history of past prices (i.e.,
the information available in our dataset): the autocorrelogram of price changes is not
significantly different from zero, at all lags and at all significance levels (see Cipriani
and Guarino [Cipriani and Guarino, 2014]).
3.7 Results
We start by presenting the parameter estimates for the model without a financial trans-
action tax. We will then illustrate the impact of the transaction tax by simulating an
economy with our parameter estimates and different tax rates.
3.7.1 Estimates
We estimate the parameters through maximum likelihood, using the Nelder-Mead sim-
plex algorithm.14 15 The optimisation routine converges to the same parameter set
starting from a large set of initial conditions. Table 3.1 presents these estimates and
their corresponding standard errors.16
Given our underlying structural model, the market maker believes that an information
14We use an implementation of the algorithm by the Numerical Algorithm Group (NAG) for the NAG
Matlab Toolbox.
15We report estimations of simulated data for our model in Appendix B.0.2. We create artificial
transaction data using our model for a range of parameters and manage to recover the parameters using
our estimation routine with satisfactory precision.
16Standard errors are computed numerically with the BHHH estimator (see Berndt et al.
[Berndt et al., 1974])
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parameters estimates s.e.
α 0.2785 0.026
δ 0.6252 0.067
µ 0.4134 0.013
τ 0.4284 0.027
ψ 0.3165×10−8 0.022
ε 0.5698 0.006
Table 3.1: Estimation Results. Estimates for the six parameters of the model and their standard
errors (s.e.).
event occurs on approximately one out of four trading days (α = 0.279) and if there
is a change in the fundamental value of the asset, it is more likely to be an upward
movement than a downward movement (δ = 0.625). On event days about 40 percent
of traders are informed (µ = 0.413), the rest being noise traders. Price inelastic noise
traders are slightly more likely to trade than to refrain from trading (ε = 0.5698). Re-
call that if they do trade, they buy and sell with equal probability by assumption. We
estimate the share of price elastic noise traders to be negligible (ψ < 10−8). Thus, es-
sentially all trading activity that is not due to private information about the fundamental
asset value is price inelastic. More precisely, we tested the hypothesis that the share of
price elastic noise traders is zero, by performing a likelihood ratio test where we set
ψ = 0 for the restricted model. The outcome of this test is reported in Table 3.2.
LL (unrestricted) LL (restricted) LR test p-value
−40573.87 −40574.32 0.8859 0.35
Table 3.2: Likelihood-Ratio Test. Log-likelihood value (LL) of the restricted and unrestricted
model as well as the LR test statistic and corresponding p-value.
We cannot reject the hypothesis that there are no price elastic noise traders in our asset
market at any conventional level of significance. In our simulations for the impact of
a financial transaction tax, we therefore use estimates obtained for a restricted version
of our original model with ψ set to zero. These are the the estimates found by Cipriani
and Guarino [Cipriani and Guarino, 2014], The five parameter estimates are reported in
Table 3.3. The estimates for the restricted model are almost identical to those obtained
for the unrestricted model.
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parameters estimates s.e.
α 0.2803 0.026
δ 0.6238 0.067
µ 0.4167 0.012
τ 0.4526 0.026
ε 0.5691 0.002
Table 3.3: Estimation Results (Restricted Model). Estimates for the five parameters of the
restricted model and their standard errors (s.e.).
3.8 Simulating the Impact of a FTT
We will now simulate how trading in our stock (Ashland Inc.) would be influenced
by the introduction of a financial transaction tax. To perform simulations of our
model under different tax scenarios we will use the estimates for the parameter vec-
tor {α,δ ,µ,τ,ε} reported in Table 3.3. To calculate the equilbrium trading thresholds
for our informed and price elastic noise traders in the presence of the tax ρ , we will
need an estimate for λH which parameterizes the size of the possible movements in the
fundamental value of the asset.17 It is the size of the tax in relation to the possible gains
and losses from holding the asset that determine the impact of the tax (recall expression
(3.9)). We use the difference between daily closing and opening prices of Ashland Inc.
for our sample period to obtain an estimate for λH . Unlike in our theoretical model,
observed price changes for our stock across days are due to two kinds of events. First,
those that were private information to traders and were revealed to the market during
the course of trading. These changes are what λH and λL in our model refer to. Second,
the events that became public information during or after the trading day. To obtain a
measure of λH we must disentangle the two componentes. To do so, we performed a
variance decomposition suggested by Hasbrouck [Hasbrouck, 1991] that allows us to
decompose stock price changes into a trade-correlated component, interpreted as the
component driven by private information, and a trade-uncorrelated component. This
procedure is discussed in more detail in the Appendix. Table B.1 reports the results
of this decomposition exercise. It gives a measure for the size of the tax in relation to
17Recall that by assumption the size of a potential fall in the fundamental value is given by λL =
[δ/(1−δ )]λH .
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potential changes in the fundamental value, where the tax rates have been chosen to
lie in the range of tax rates for a financial transaction tax proposed or already recently
implemented.
tax 0.1 % 0.2 % 0.5 %
ρ/λh 0.1526 0.3053 0.7632
Table 3.4: Calibration of FTT
These estimates suggest that if we imposed, for example, a 0.1 percent tax, the amount
of tax paid would be approximately equal to 15 percent of the upside risk in the funda-
mental value due to private information. This cost would go up to 75 percent for a 0.5
percent tax.
We simulate the model for 10,000 trading days each having 149 trading times. 18
The simulations yield a trade sequence and the corresponding ask and bid prices for
each trading day.
3.8.1 Impact on Volume and Spreads
We start by investigating the impact of the tax on the trading volume. Tables 3.5 and
3.6 report the percentage of trading times that result in a trade (either buy or sell) with
and without tax. The results are reported by type of event day and for different trading
periods. As one can see, if we consider all days and all trading activity during the
course of a day, the introduction of a 0.5 percent transaction tax leads, on average, to
a drop in the trading volume of 9 percentage points (from trading ( buy or sell ) at 59
percent of the possible trading times to 50 percent). If we consider event days only,
this impact increases to a 33 percentage point drop in volume. A smaller tax of 0.1
percent would still lead to a drop of 15 percentage points. As our estimate for the
share of price elastic noise traders was zero, this drop is purely due to informed traders,
who now prefer not to trade on their private information in order to avoid paying the tax.
18The transaction data for Ashland Inc. have an average of 149 trading times per trading day given
our chosen no-trade interval.
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1−149 1−50 51−100 101−149
0% 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.59
0.1% 0.55 0.57 0.55 0.53
0.2% 0.53 0.55 0.53 0.52
0.5% 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Table 3.5: Trade volume by tax rates (all days). Fraction of trading times at which trade (buy
or sell) takes place by trading period and tax rate.
1−149 1−50 51−100 101−149
0% 0.66 0.68 0.65 0.64
0.1% 0.51 0.58 0.50 0.56
0.2% 0.45 0.49 0.44 0.40
0.5% 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
Table 3.6: Trade volume by tax rates (event days). Fraction of trading times at which trade
(buy or sell) takes place by trading period and tax rate.
Note that for a 0.5 percent tax the percentage of trades in event days is 33. This value
corresponds to no informed trader trading and all trades coming from price inelastic
noise traders (since in this case a trade happens with probability (1− µ)ε = 0.332).
Essentially this means that in our asset market a transaction tax of 0.5 percent would
crowd out all informed trade.
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 show the impact of the tax on the bid-ask spread. Clearly, since a tax
of 0.5 percent crowds out all informed traders, the spread for this tax level drops to zero.
This provides a note of caution should one want to use bid-ask spreads to evaluate the
impact of a transaction tax on market liquidity. Narrower spreads can be a consequence
of informed traders being driven out of the market. We note that while spreads are
monotonically decreasing in the tax on event days, the relationship is non-monotonic if
we pool all days, first increasing and then decreasing with the tax. To understand this,
note that in our economy (with no price elastic noise traders) the tax has two opposing
effects on the spread. On the one hand, a higher tax crowds out informed traders and
thus the market maker needs to protect himself less against private information. This
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leads to a lower spread. On the opther hand, fewer informed traders also means that the
market maker learns the value less quickly and, therefore, spreads converge to zero at a
slower pace. Figure 3.4 illustrates the behaviour of spreads over the course of a trading
day across different tax regimes.
1−149 1−50 51−100 101−149
0% 0.025 0.037 0.024 0.016
0.1% 0.027 0.038 0.026 0.016
0.2% 0.023 0.033 0.023 0.014
0.5% 0 0 0 0
Table 3.7: Bid-ask spread by tax rates (all days). Mean bid-ask spread by trading period and
tax rate.
1−149 1−50 51−100 101−149
0% 0.054 0.061 0.057 0.043
0.1% 0.045 0.049 0.048 0.036
0.2% 0.042 0.046 0.045 0.033
0.5% 0 0 0 0
Table 3.8: Bid-ask spread by tax rates (event days).Mean bid-ask spread by trading period and
tax rate.
Finally, it is interesting to study how the cost of the tax compares to the cost due to
the bid-ask spread (which in our framework is caused by the adverse selection due to
private information). We use half the spread as a measure of this cost. Tables 3.9 and
3.10 report the ratio of half the spread to the amount of tax paid per transaction ρ . For
all tax levels the transaction cost caused by the tax is larger than the cost induced by
the spread.
1−149 1−50 51−100 101−149
0.1% 0.40 0.56 0.38 0.24
0.2% 0.17 0.24 0.17 0.10
0.5% 0 0 0 0
Table 3.9: Bid-ask spread in relation to FTT (all days). Mean bid-ask spread divided by 2 as
a fraction of the transaction tax ρ by trading period and tax rate.
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Figure 3.4: Spreads by tax regime. The figure displays average spreads on ’no event day’ over
course of trading day for three tax regimes.
1−149 1−50 51−100 101−149
0.1% 0.66 0.72 0.71 0.53
0.2% 0.31 0.34 0.33 0.24
0.5% 0 0 0 0
Table 3.10: Bid-ask spread in relation to FTT (event days). Mean bid-ask spread divided by 2
as a fraction of the transaction tax ρ by trading period and tax rate.
3.8.2 Impact of Informational Efficiency
We now investigate how the transaction tax influences the ability of the market to ag-
gregate private information into the price. We focus on the evolution of the market
maker’s expected value of the fundamental value, pdt = E
(
V d|hdt
)
(which we have de-
fined, for convenience, as the price of the asset) over the course of the trading day.
We analyse to what extent this price deviates from the true fundamental value vd over
the course of the trading day across different tax rates. In particular, we focus on the
average absolute deviation of this price from the fundamental value normalized by the
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expected value of the asset at the start of trading, which is δ , that is,
1
T
T
∑
t=1
∣∣∣∣ pdt − vdδ
∣∣∣∣ .
Table 3.11 reports this average deviation from the fundamental value for the different
tax rates. We focus on event days only, as our focus is on how well the price is able to
reflect private information about asset values. On days without events, no such infor-
mation is present in the market.
First we note that,as a 0.5 percent tax crowds out all informed trade, the price under
such a tax regime remains constant at the expected value of the fundamental asset at
t = 1 which is δ . On event days the deviations of the price from the fundamental values
are given by (1−δ )/δ and (δ −0)/δ for good and bad days respectively.
Increasing the tax unambiguously reduces the informational efficiency of the asset mar-
ket. Going from a market without transaction tax to a market where each transaction is
taxed at 0.2 percent increases the average deviation of the price from the fundamental
value by 8 percentage points on good event days and by 14 percentage points on bad
event days.
good event bad event
0% 0.37 0.61
0.1% 0.40 0.67
0.2% 0.45 0.75
0.5% 0.61 1
Table 3.11: Price deviation from fundamental value. Absolute price deviation from funda-
mental value as a fraction of expected value by tax rates.
Next we consider by how much prices in a market with transaction taxation would de-
viate from the price that would obtain in a market without a transaction tax. Table 3.12
reports the average absolute deviation over a trading day normalized by the expected
value of the asset δ . We see that this deviation can be as large as 46 percent on bad
event days for a tax of 0.5%.
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good event bad event
0.1% 0.12 0.16
0.2% 0.17 0.23
0.5% 0.33 0.46
Table 3.12: Price deviation from price without FFT. Absolute price deviation from price with-
out transaction tax as a fraction of expected value by tax rates.
3.9 Conclusion
We have developed a novel methodology to quantify the impact of a financial transac-
tion tax on informational efficiency and market liquidity. We have extended a standard
model of sequential trading by including both price elastic liquidity traders and traders
with private information of heterogeneous quality. To illustrate our methodology, we
have estimated the model for a stock traded on the NYSE and then used these estimates
to simulate the effect a transaction tax would have on trading in this specific stock.
For the specific stock used in the analysis (Ashland Inc.) we found that noise trading
(e.g. trades due to liquidity needs) is relatively unresponsive to prices and, thus, the
major effect of a transaction tax is on informed trading. Therefore, the financial trans-
action tax has a negative effect on informational efficiency.
Whether this result is peculiar to our stock or holds across many types of stocks and for
various time horizons is an important topic for future research.
Chapter 4
Preemption and Delay: Debt
Financing with Roll Over Risk
4.1 Introduction
When investing under uncertainty investment decisions undertaken by other investors
carry double weight. Firstly, they may directly impact the returns of the common
investment project. Failure to roll over short term debt by one party, for example, can
inflict considerable costs on the remaining investors if it triggers costly liquidation.
Investment decision with several parties involved will generally involve such payoff
externalities. Secondly, when investment decisions are based on private information,
observing other investors’ actions reveals additional information about the investment’s
payoff. Such informed actions thus create an informational externality by reducing the
payoff uncertainty of those who are able to observe them.
The strategic implications of these two externalities for dynamic interactions between
investors can be quite distinct. Informational externalities are well-known to cause
strategic delays ( e.g. Chamley and Gale [Chamley and Gale, 1994] ). Waiting has
an option value as it allows to gather additional information by observing other in-
vestors’ actions. This option value reduces the incentives to act immediately upon
receiving private information. Investors try to outwait each other. Payoff externalities,
on the other hand, can create preemption motives when late movers’ payoffs are neg-
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atively affected by previously taken actions. Banks runs ( e.g. Diamond and Dybvig
[Diamond and Dybvig, 1983] ) are a prominent consequence of such negative payoff
externalities.
We study the interplay of such informational and payoff externalities in a model where
several parties invest in a common project with risky returns. We show that the pre-
emption motive created by negative payoff externalities can counteract the incentives to
delay actions that arise from the ability to observe other investors. This counteracting
force is shown to facilitate information revelation and thereby improve the efficiency
of investment decisions.
In our model two investors hold claims, consisting of a mix of short term and long
term debt, to the future risky payoffs of an investment project and can receive private
information about these payoffs. Short term debt has to be rolled over at intermediate
stages of the project and failure to do so by either investor triggers liquidation with
a fixed liquidation value. Thus the decision to liquidate by one investor impacts the
payoff of the other investor. This is the source of the payoff externality in our model.
Short term debt which has not been rolled over is senior to both long term debt and
rolled-over short term debt in the case of liquidation. The ratio of short term to long
term debt thus controls the size of the payoff externality. The ability to observe the
roll over decisions of the other investor allows inference about his information and
thereby creates informational externalities. We solve for the unique perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in symmetric strategies of this game and show that an appropriately chosen
mix of short term and long term debt can guarantee efficient liquidation decisions. We
show that the optimal level of the payoff externalities created through short term debt
crucially depends on the liquidation value of the project and the quality of the private
information received by investors.
Related Literature The topic of observational learning has triggered a large literature.
Important early contributions are Chamley and Gale [Chamley and Gale, 1994], Gul
and Lundholm [Gul and Lundholm, 1995] and Bikhchandani et al. [Bikhchandani et al., 1998].
A key insight of these models is that the ability to observe others’ behaviour generates
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an option value from waiting and can thereby impedes the revelation of privately held
information. Gale [Gale, 1996] provides an overview.
Our model is closely related to Weeds [Weeds, 2002] who analyses a model of invest-
ment under uncertainty where preemption motives interact with incentives to delay
caused by option values. However, in her work the option value of waiting does
not arise from the ability to observe other players’ actions but from a commonly
observed stochastic process that reveals information about the profitability of invest-
ment over time. Frisell [Frisell, 2003] also models a setting where these two forces
are at work, analysing a product placement game. However his focus is on under-
standing the timing of moves rather than on the issue of information revelation. Gu
[Gu, 2011] analyses a model of fundamental bank runs in the tradition of Allen and
Gale [Allen and Gale, 2002]. In his model depositors receive both information about
their consumption preferences and the payoff of an illiquid asset their bank is invested
in. Depositors then have to decide whether to withdraw or keep their savings in the
bank. Gu’s setup includes both payoff externalities arising through the possibility of
bank runs as well as informational externalities coming from the ability to observe
other depositors’ withdrawal decision. However his agents are atomistic and only a
measure zero set of them has private information. Additionally informed agents do
not move simultaneously which weakens preemption motives. Our setup with a finite
number of actors and simultaneous moves allows for richer strategic interactions and
consequently yields equilibrium behaviour that differs from Gu’s analysis. We will see
that in our model mixed strategies play an important role, whereas Gu’s equilibrium
is in pure strategies. Furthermore our focus is on the optimal financial structure of the
investment in the presence of payoff and informational externalities, a topic Gu does
not deal with.
Technically, the equilibrium construction in this paper is closely related to the approach
used in Murto and Va¨lima¨ki [Murto and Va¨lima¨ki, 2011] which looks at information
aggregation in an exit game when privately informed players can observe each other
exit decisions. However in their model exit decisions do not cause any payoff external-
ities, which facilitates the equilibrium analysis considerably.
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the setup of our
investment game, sections 3 solves for the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the
game. Section 4 derives the efficient investment policy and section 5 shows how it can
be implemented through an appropriate mix of short term and long term debt claims.
Section 6 discusses assumptions of the model. Section 7 concludes.
4.2 Model Setup
Project Characteristics We consider an investment project with uncertain payoff. The
project can either be successful and pay out Y units at maturity, or it is unsuccessful
in which case its payoff at maturity is zero. Whether the project is successful or not
depends on the underlying state of the world θ ∈ {0,1} where state 1 (θ = 1) implies
success and state 0 (θ = 0) failure. The prior probability of success is 0 < µ0 < 1.
Time evolves in discrete periods t = 0,1,2, ... At t = 0 nature chooses the state of
the world θ with P({θ = 1}) = µ0. At each point in time t > 0, if still active, the
investment project matures with probability 0 < γ < 1 and pays out in the successful
state only. If the project does not mature in period t it can be liquidated. Liquidation
yields 0 < L <Y units irrespective of the state of the world θ . If the project has neither
matured nor been liquidated in period t it carries on into the next period t+1.
Investors Investors are risk neutral and have a discount rate of zero. Each investor’s
claims consist of a mix of short term and long term debt with face value ds and dl
respectively. Long term debt entitles its owner to a payment of dl when the project
matures. Short term debt can be claimed in every period t with a promised payment of
ds. Alternatively an investor can decide to roll over his short term debt in which case
he is entitled to a payment of ds in the next period t +1. Roll over decisions for short
term debt are made simultaneously by all active investors.
The number of active investors depends on the state of the world θ . In state 0 there are
two active investors, each of whom has to make a roll over decision for his short term
debt in every period. In state 1 there is at most one investor with a roll over decision
to make. Given that the project is unsuccessful in state 0, the presence of two active
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investors then indicates failure of the project. Hence having an active roll over decision
to make is a negative signal for an individual investor. His beliefs concerning state 1
are given by µ < µ0. A given investor does not know whether there is a second investor
present who has a roll over decision to make. 1
Liquidation of project If at least one investor refuses to roll over his short term debt,
the project has to be liquidated with liquidation revenue L. Claimed short term debt
is senior to both long term debt and rolled over short term debt. The latter two are of
equal seniority. Hence in case of a unilateral withdrawal by one investor, the investor
who refuses to roll over receives
min{ds,L}+max
{
0,
L−ds
2
}
whereas the investor who has rolled over his short term debt receives
max
{
0,
L−ds
2
}
.
If both investors refuse to roll over their short term debt in a given period, both receive
half of the liquidation revenue, that is L/2.
In what follows we assume that a unilaterally withdrawing investor will receive the
full face value of his short term debt, that is ds ≤ L. Furthermore to simplify notation
we define
φ = ds+
L−ds
2
(4.1)
1To generate such beliefs one could, for example, assume that there are two potentially active in-
vestors and that in state 0 both of them are active. In state 1 however at most one of them is chosen to
be active. An investor is chosen to be active with probability 0 < q ≤ 1 and each investor has an equal
probability to be active in state 1. An individual investor can only observe that he has an active decision
to make, but does not know whether the same is true for the second investor. By Bayes’ Rule we would
have
µ =
(1/2)qµ0
(1/2)qµ0+(1−µ0) < µ0
The lower q, the more informative is the fact that one has to make a roll over decision. We can think of
q as the probability of any investor receiving a negative signal about the outlook of the project, when in
fact the project is successful.
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exit roll over
exit l, l φ ,2l−φ
roll over 2l−φ ,φ
Table 4.1: Payoff matrix in case of liquidation
which stands for the amount received by a unilaterally withdrawing investor. Also
define as l = L/2 the per-capita liquidation revenue. Payments in case at least one
investor refuses to roll over his short term debt are then given by the payoff matrix in
Table 4.1.
If the project matures in period t, an investor is paid ds+dl in state 1 and zero in state
0. In the following we assume that the final payoff of the project in case of success is
Y = 2 and each active investor in state 1 receives half of this, that is ds+dl = 1.
4.3 The Liquidation Game
An individual investor does not know whether he faces an active co-investor or not. He
can however draw inference about the state of the world from the absence of liquidation
up to the current period. If active investors do not roll over their short term debt with
probability 1, the absence of liquidation in previous periods constitutes good news. It
increases the likelihood of state 1 and thus the probability that the investment project
has a positive payoff at maturity. However to the extent that observing the survival
of the project provides valuable information on its eventual success and discount rates
are zero, an individual investor has an incentive to wait in order to gather additional
information. Waiting might dominate the withdrawal of short term financing and in
equilibrium nothing can be learnt about the state of the world by observing the survival
of the project. Investors would ignore their private information when making invest-
ment decisions. We show that if the cost of being preempted is sufficiently high and
active investors’ information is sufficiently precise, that is they are sufficiently pes-
simistic about the success of the project, such a situation cannot occur in equilibrium.
Investors will always be able to learn about the state of the project from the absence of
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its liquidation in previous periods.
We now analyse the dynamic game played by active investors, starting in period
t = 1 and lasting until either the investment project matures or at least one investor
withdraws his short term funding. The equilibrium concept will be perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (PBE) and we will restrict our attention to symmetric strategies. An in-
vestor’s information set at time t only consists of whether the project is still active or
not. As the withdrawal of short term funding by either investor terminates the game,
an individual investor’s strategy σ then simply specifies an exit probability σt ∈ [0,1]
for any time period t in which the game is still active. Given an equilibrium strategy σ
beliefs µ are then calculated using Bayes’ Rule
µt+1 =
µt
1−σt(1−µt) (4.2)
with µ1 = µ . The pair (σ ,µ ) is a PBE of the game if for any time t in which the game
is still active, σt is a best response to {σ j} j≥t given beliefs µt and beliefs are updated
using the equilibrium strategy according to (4.2).
We will now show that this game has a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in sym-
metric strategies. Whether liquidation occurs in equilibrium depends on investors’
initial beliefs µ . For sufficiently optimistic beliefs investors will always roll over
their short term debt and the project will be carried out until maturity. In particular
if the payoff from unilaterally withdrawing short term financing, φ , is lower than the
expected eventual payoff of the project, µ , rolling over until maturity is preferred to
withdrawing if the other investor does so, too. For sufficiently pessimistic beliefs the
only equilibrium outcome is immediate refusal to roll over. Here even if the opponent’s
behaviour is maximally informative, that is he liquidates with probability 1 and thus
the state of the world could be learnt by waiting one more period, an active investor
prefers to withdraw short term funding. Waiting would yield µ + (1− µ)(2l − φ)
whereas withdrawing would result in a payoff of µφ +(1− µ)l. Equating these two
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payoff determines the critical value µˆ for beliefs below which immediate withdrawal
is the only equilibrium. For intermediate values of beliefs µ every active investor rolls
over short term funding with strictly positive probability less than 1. Proposition 1
characterises the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in symmetric strategies, which
is then proven to be an equilibrium of this game in a sequence of lemmata.
Proposition 8. The liquidation game has a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in
symmetric strategies. There exists a µˆ ∈ (0,φ) such that an informed player refuses to
roll over short term debt if µ < µˆ , refuses to do so with probability 0 < σ1 < 1 in the
first period and never thereafter if µ ∈ (µˆ,φ) and continues to finance the project until
maturity with probability 1 if µ > φ where
µˆ =
φ − l
1− l and σ1 =
φ −µ
(1−µ)l
V (µt ;σ ) will designate the equilibrium value of the subgame starting at t for an active
player given that the equilibrium strategy is σ and current beliefs of the player are µt .
We have
V (µt ;σ ) = max{[1− (1−µt)σt ]φ +(1−µt)σt l,
(1−µt)σt(2l−φ)+ [1− (1−µt)σt ][(1− γ)µt+1+ γV (µt+1;σ )]}
where the first term is the expected payoff of liquidation in t and the second term is the
expected payoff of continuation in t given the equilibrium strategy σ .
We start by showing that if the expected payoff at maturity of the investment is suffi-
ciently high, it will never be liquidated in equilibrium.
Lemma 1. If µt > φ no liquidation occurs in the subgame starting in period t.
Proof. Suppose there exists a period τ ≥ t such that στ > 0. Then the player has to
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weakly prefer liquidation to continuation in period τ , that is
[1− (1−µτ)στ ]φ +(1−µτ)στ l
≥ (1−µτ)στ(2l−φ)+ [1− (1−µτ)στ ][(1− γ)µτ+1+ γV (µτ+1;σ )]
where V (µτ+1;σ ) is the equilibrium payoff of the game in period τ + 1. But as
V (µτ+1;σ )≥ µτ+1 2 this requires that
φ ≥ (1−µτ)στ l+µτ
which cannot hold as µτ > φ was assumed.
Next we show that for sufficiently pessimistic beliefs liquidation has to occur with
strictly positive probability.
Lemma 2. If µt < φ then in equilibrium we have σt > 0.
Proof. We consider two possibilities in turn: firstly continuation forever from t on-
wards and, secondly, continuation with probability 1 up to some period k > t and liqui-
dation with strictly positive probability thereafter.
To see that the first scenario cannot be an equilibrium, note that the equilibrium payoff
of continuing forever would be µt whereas a deviation to exit with probability 1 in pe-
riod t would yield φ > µt .
Next suppose in equilibrium continuation is played with probability 1 from period t
until k > t and k + 1 is the first period with strictly positive exit probability. For
σk+1 > 0 we need V (µk+1;σ ) = [1− (1− µk+1)σk+1]φ +(1− µk+1)σk+1l, which is
the expected payoff from exiting in period k+1. As σt+ j = 0 for all 0 ≤ j ≤ k− t we
have µk+1 = µk = µt by (4.2). Nothing is learned from observing continuation of the
project. Thus in k continuation is a best response to σk = 0 if
φ ≤ (1− γ)µt + γ {[1− (1−µt)σk+1]φ +(1−µt)σk+1l}
2Playing “always continue” from τ + 1 onwards has an expected payoff of at least µτ+1 + (1−
µτ+1)(2l−φ).
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But this inequality cannot hold if µt < φ . It follows from the two above observations
that in any equilibrium we need σt > 0 as long as µt < φ .
The next lemma establishes that there cannot be two consecutive periods such that a
player mixes between exiting and rolling over in one period, and then exits with strictly
positive probability in the following period.
Lemma 3. If µt < φ it cannot be the case that 0 < σt < 1 and σt+1 > 0.
Proof. In this case the player has to be indifferent between exiting and rolling over in
period t. We thus need
V (µt ;σ ) = [1− (1−µt)σt ]φ +(1−µt)σt l
Furthermore we have
V (µt ;σ ) = (1−µt)σt(2l−φ)+ [1− (1−µt)σt ][(1− γ)µt+1+ γV (µt+1;σ )]
Combining these two conditions yields
(1−µt)σt(φ − l) = [1− (1−µt)σt ][(1− γ)(µt+1−φ)+ γ (V (µt+1;σ )−φ)]
the left hand side of which is strictly positive. However for σt+1 > 0 we need µt+1 ≤ φ
or else continuation with probability 1 would be the only possible equilibrium of the
subgame starting in period t +1. For the equality to hold it must thus be the case that
V (µt+1;σ ) > φ . But this contradicts the fact that liquidation with positive probability
requires V (µt+1;σ ) to equal the payoff from liquidation in period t + 1, which is less
than φ .
For intermediate values of beliefs the project cannot be liquidated with probability 1.
Here the option value of waiting and learning the true state in the next period if the
opposing player exits exceeds the benefits of early exit.
Lemma 4. The project is liquidated with probability 1 in period t if and only if µt +
(1−µt)l < φ .
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Proof. We start with the only if part of the statement. Suppose σt = 1. If no exit occurs
in period t the player knows that θ = 1 and will continue in all subsequent periods
given that φ < 1. Rolling over in period t thus yields (1−µt)(2l−φ)+µt . Immediate
exit yields µtφ +(1−µt)l. It follows that rolling over in period t is strictly preferred to
exit as long as φ < µt +(1−µt)l.
We now prove the if part of the statement. By Lemma 2 we know that in equilibrium
we need σt > 0 and by Lemma 3 we also know that this implies σt+ j = 0 for all j > 0.
Thus for any σt > 0 exiting is strictly preferred to rolling over if
[1− (1−µt)]φ +(1−µt)σt l > (1−µt)σt(2l−φ)+µt
where the left hand side is the expected payoff from exiting in period t and the right
hand side is the expected payoff from continuation in t. It follows that exiting is strictly
preferred to rolling over if φ > (1− µt)σt l + µt . But this is true for any σt > 0 and
consequently in equilibrium we necessarily have σt = 1.
Define µˆ as the belief such that µˆ +(1− µˆ)l = φ . The above lemmata establish that
if the initial belief µ is strictly lower than µˆ , then the only equilibrium in symmetric
strategies is immediate exit with probability 1 in period 1. If µ > φ , then in equilibrium
the project is never liquidated. For intermediate levels of beliefs ( µˆ < µ < φ ) the
project has to be liquidated with strictly positive probability 0 < σ1 < 1 in period 1
in any equilibrium in symmetric strategies. Conditional on not having been liquidated
then, it is never liquidated thereafter.
Lastly we derive the equilibrium exit probability σ1 for µˆ < µ < φ . Continuation
with probability 1 from period 2 onwards implies that V (µ2;σ) = µ2. For the player
to be indifferent between exiting and rolling over in period 1 given this continuation
value we need
φ = (1−µ)σ1l+µ ⇒ σ1 = φ −µ
(1−µ)l
As 0 < φ − µ < (1− µ)l we have 0 < σ1 < 1 as required. It remains to check that
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µ2 ≥ φ or else continuation from period 2 onwards would not be an equilibrium. But
by (4.2) and the assumption that φ ≥ l we have
µ2 =
µl
µ− (φ − l) ≥ φ
This concludes the proof of Proposition 8. 
4.4 Efficient Liquidation
As a benchmark for efficient liquidation of the project we consider the roll over policy
a planner would choose for an active investor, not knowing whether another active
investor is present or not. For each period t the roll over decision can only be based
on the number of periods the project has been active without being liquidated. We
thus restrict the planner to using the same information available to an individual active
investor when making roll-over decisions. We also restrict the planner to symmetric
roll over policies, that is he cannot specify policies that vary with the identity of the
investor. These two restrictions on the planner’s choice of policy appear natural if
we want to find a benchmark against which to judge the economic efficiency of the
previously derived symmetric PBE.
Given the above restrictions a roll over policy is then a vector {λt}∞t=1 where λt ∈ [0,1]
specifies the probability with which an active investor refuses to roll over short term
debt in period t given that the investment project has not been liquidated previously.
The planner’s problem can be formulated as a dynamic programming problem where
the investor’s belief µt constitutes the state variable in period t which evolves according
to
µt+1 =
µt
1−λt(1−µt) (4.3)
using Bayes’ Rule and the fact that an active co-investor would follow the suggested
roll over policy. A given λt then implies an expected liquidation probability of µtλt +
(1−µt)[1−(1−λt)2] in period t. Either there is only one active investor ( µt ) in which
case liquidation occurs with probability λt or the other investor has a roll over choice
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as well ( 1−µt ) and the project is liquidated if at least one of the investors exits. This
happens with probability 1−(1−λt)2. In case of continuation the project pays out with
probability 1− γ . With probability γ the project continues with updated beliefs µt+1.
The Bellman Equation for this problem is then given by
W (µt) = max
λt∈[0,1]
{
[λtµt +[1− (1−λt)2](1−µt)]l+
[(1−λt)µt +(1−λt)2(1−µt)] [(1− γ)µt+1+ γW (µt+1)]
}
(4.4)
where µt+1 is obtained from (4.3).
Proposition 9. (Efficient Liquidation) There exists a µ∗ ∈ (0,1) such that an investor
with initial belief µ > µ∗ never withdraws short term funding. An investor with initial
belief µ < µ∗ exits with probability λ (µ) ∈ (0,1) in the first period. If no liquidation
occurs in the first period the project is continued until maturity. We have
µ∗ =
2l
1+ l
> l and λ (µ) =
1
2
[
1− µ− l
(1−µ)l
]
Proof. see Appendix
To gain intuition for this result, consider an active investor with belief µ . Suppose the
symmetric roll over policy prescribes continuation with probability 1−λ in the current
period. The benefits from continuation are given by µ(1−λ )(1− l) and derive from
receiving 1 rather than the liquidation value l in the high payoff state. The opportunity
cost of continuation arises from the potential loss of liquidation value l in the low
payoff state which occurs if both investors continue. It is thus (1− µ)[1− (1−λ )2]l.
The optimal continuation probability λ (µ) equalizes the marginal benefit and cost of
continuation. For µ > µ∗ the marginal benefit of continuation exceeds the marginal
cost for any λ ∈ [0,1]. Thus liquidation is never optimal. Indeed, if µ > l the only
reason for liquidating with positive probability is the creation of an option value of
waiting for the co-investor. This option value is maximal if the co-investor learns the
state with probability 1 by waiting one more period. Thus the maximal option value
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is (1− µ)l as the state is bad with probability 1− µ in which case liquidation yields
l rather than 0. The opportunity cost of liquidation in a given period is µ − l. Thus
liquidation can never be efficient if
µ− l > (1−µ)l ⇒ µ > µ∗
4.5 Optimal Maturity Structure
We now show how the efficient roll over policy derived in the previous section can be
implemented as a symmetric PBE of the liquidation game by endowing investors with
an appropriate mix of short term and long term debt claims to the investment project’s
payoff. Increasing the share of short term debt in an investor’s portfolio increases his
incentive to withdraw financing as the reward in case of unilateral exit goes up. The
share of short term debt is thus a key design parameter in order to control an investor’s
roll over probability. It should be chosen is such a way that the incentives of an in-
dividual investor are aligned with the objectives of the planner. Here two conflicting
aspects of the liquidation decision have to be traded off against each other. On the one
hand a higher probability of withdrawal by one investor increases the option value of
waiting for the other investor. The observation that the investment project is carried on
for another period becomes more informative about the state of the world. On the other
hand increasing the probability of liquidation lowers the payoff in the successful state
1. This cost is higher, the higher is the probability of success µ and lower, the higher is
the liquidation value l. Proposition 3 characterises the optimal share of short term debt
ds.
Proposition 10. For any initial belief µ ∈ (0,1) there exists a face value ds such that the
equilibrium strategy σ of the liquidation game coincides with the efficient liquidation
policy. We have
ds =
(1− l)µ if µ < µ
∗
0 if µ ≥ µ∗
where µ∗ = 2l/(1+ l).
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Proof. Recall that from (4.1) we have ds = 2(φ − l). φ needs to be such that for initial
beliefs µ > µ∗ players never exit the project and for beliefs µ < µ∗ players exit with
probability σ1 = λ (µ) ∈ (0,1) in the first period and continue with probability 1 if no
liquidation has occurred in the first period.
First consider µ > µ∗. Here continuation until maturity is the unique symmetric equi-
librium outcome if µ > φ or equivalently if ds < 2(µ− l). If we set ds = 0 this inequal-
ity is satisfied for all µ > µ∗.
Next consider µ < µ∗. In this case the efficient liquidation policy prescribes exit with
probability λ (µ) in the first period and continuation until maturity in the absence of
immediate liquidation. For this to be consistent with equilibrium behaviour in a sym-
metric PBE we need 0 < φ −µ < (1−µ)l and σ1 = λ (µ). The latter equality implies
φ = l+(1/2)(1− l)µ or equivalently ds = (1− l)µ and it is easily verified that for this
choice of φ the former inequalities hold for all µ ∈ (0,µ∗).
We note that for sufficiently optimistic beliefs (i.e. imprecise private information) the
benefits of creating option value are outweighed by the expected costs of liquidating a
successful project and thus the optimal debt structure does not involve any short term
debt. The sole purpose of short term debt in this model is to create a preemption motive,
which for µ > µ∗ is not desirable. If however beliefs fall below the critical value µ∗
and creating option values through positive withdrawal probabilities by active investors
become optimal, the more optimistic investors are, the higher has to be the optimal
share of short term debt in their portfolio. More optimistic investors need stronger
incentives to be induced to withdraw short term funding.
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Figure 4.1: Share of short term debt and liquidation value
Figure 4.1 plots optimal short term debt shares ds against liquidation values l for differ-
ent levels of beliefs. Firstly, it can be seen that the more optimistic investors are about
the success of the project, the higher has to be the liquidation value in order to justify
the use of short term debt as a means to incentivise information revelation. Secondly,
the optimal share of short term debt becomes more sensitive to variations in the liquida-
tion value the more optimistic investors are. Lastly, we note that the optimal maturity
structure is not necessarily monotonous in investors’ beliefs. For a given liquidation
value l the optimal short term debt share can first increase in the level of investors’
beliefs about success, but then drop off to zero as liquidation becomes too costly. 3
4.6 Discussion
Communication between Investors We have ruled out direct communication between
investors. If we allowed investors to pool their information, they would be able to learn
the state of the world with certainty. Firstly, ruling out this possibility is motivated by
desire to analyse a market where investors are anonymous and the absence of liquida-
tion of investment projects is the only way through which privately held information
can be communicated. Secondly, suppose we allowed investors to directly exchange in-
3In figure 4.1 such a situation could for example occur for l = 0.5 where ds = 0 for µ = 0.9 but the
optimal short term debt share is higher for µ = 0.5 than for µ = 0.1.
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formation. Would investors have an incentive to reveal their private information truth-
fully? Not necessarily. Assume that short term debt face values are such that φ > l
and consider two investors, A and B. Suppose B reveals his information truthfully and
agreed behaviour is such that in state 0 both investors exit while in state 1 both roll
over. Now A does have an incentive to convince B that he has not received any bad
news about the project. In this case B will roll over and A will exit receiving φ rather
than l, which is what he would get if he revealed his information truthfully. Obviously,
if preemption motives are absent, that is if φ = l, truthful revelation of information
becomes unproblematic.
Asymmetric Strategies In our analysis we have focused on equilibria in symmetric
strategies. The equilibrium analysed above was found to be unique within this class of
equilibria. But what about perfect Bayesian equilibria in asymmetric strategies? There
are indeed other equilibria of the game when we allow for asymmetries in the players’
behaviour. Consider for example a setting where the active players’ priors satisfy the
condition
µ < φ < µ+(1−µ)l.
Label players as investor A and investor B. Now consider the following equilibrium
strategies: investor B, when active, always rolls over. Investor A, when active, always
exits. As investor B always continues, investor A cannot learn anything from waiting.
Thus as long as his payoff from exiting, which is φ given that B rolls over in period 1,
is higher than his payoff from continuing until maturity, which is µ , he prefers to exit
in period 1. Now consider investor B: if he waits in period 1, he knows the state of
the project in period 2. Investor A’s behaviour perfectly reveals this state. B’s payoff
from rolling over in period 1 is therefore µ+(1−µ)(2l−φ), his payoff from exiting
is µφ +(1− µ)l. The former exceeds the latter if φ < µ +(1− µ)l. This proves that
the above strategies for A and B, which depend on the identity of the investor, indeed
constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game.
So why the focus on symmetric strategies ? We want to think of our model as applying
to a market with anonymous investors without the ability to communicate other than
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through their investment decisions. Within such a setting it is difficult to perceive how
investors would be able to coordinate on the use of asymmetric strategies.
4.7 Conclusion
Financing investment projects with claims whose maturity does not match the matu-
rity of the project itself bears the risk of premature liquidation through withdrawal of
funding. This risk is particularly severe if the promised payoff of the claims is not state
contingent, as such payoff structures create strong preemption motives for individual
investors in the event of bad news about the project’s outlook.
Here we have shown that such roll over risk, which in our model arises from a maturity
mismatch due to short term debt financing of a long term project with risky payoffs, can
improve investment decisions by making investors’ actions more informative. We have
seen that the ability to learn about the risky payoffs of the project by observing other
investors’ funding decisions creates an option value for waiting in order to gather ad-
ditional information. This informational externality induces investors to roll over their
debt rather than to act on private information about payoffs. The informational content
of funding decisions is reduced. Rewarding the early withdrawal of funding through
preferential allocation of liquidation revenue counteracts this force. This is what short
term debt with its fixed face value achieves in our model. However if these preemption
motives are too strong, investors exit immediately upon receiving bad news and nothing
can be learned from other investors’ funding decisions. We have derived the optimal
share of short term debt to counterbalance such informational and payoff externalities.
We have seen that if the private information received by investors is not sufficiently
precise, the optimal share of short term debt financing is zero. The opportunity cost
of liquidating a profitable project outweighs the option value created by the ability to
observe funding decisions based on private information. For sufficiently precise private
information about the project’s payoff, the optimal share of short term debt is strictly
positive. The preemption motive it creates for investors facilitates information reve-
lation and enables the efficient liquidation of unprofitable investments. Optimal short
term debt shares are found to decrease in the precision of the private information re-
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ceived by investors and the liquidation value of the project. Better informed investors
need weaker incentives to act on their private information. Equally, incentives to with-
draw funding prematurely can be weakened if the opportunity costs of liquidation are
low.
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A1 Monopolistic Price Discrimination with Non-Common Priors
The following section closely follows Armstrong [Armstrong, 1996] who analyzes a
very similar setting in which customers differ in their probability distributions for fu-
ture demand, but the firm and customers have identical priors. Armstrong solves for
the monopolist’s optimal menu of tariffs under Assumption 1.
The monopolist offers his customers a menu of price schedules {P(q, j)} j∈J before
these customers know their type θ . Customers will therefore have to forecast their
type and thus their demand for the good in order to pick the individually optimal price
schedule P(q, j) from the offered menu J.
Consumers differ in their prior over the ex-post type θ . In particular the prior of a
consumer of ex-ante type α is the distribution function F(θ ,α). The firm has a prior
F(θ , αˆ) over the ex-post types θ which is identical for each of its customers. It can-
not observe the ex-ante types α but knows their population distribution G(α), where
α ∈ [αL,αH ].
The firm chooses a menu of price schedules {P(q, j)} that maximizes expected profits
given that each customers picks the price schedule which maximizes her expected
utility ( where expectations are take over the respective priors ). Appealing to the
revelation principle the problem is to maximize profits over a menu of price schedules
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{P(q(θ ,α),α)}, such that these schedules are both ex-ante and ex-post incentive com-
patible, and that they are ex-ante individually rational.
A consumer’s surplus with ex-post type θ , who has chosen the price schedule P(q,α)
will be defined as
s(θ ,α) = max
q≥0
u(q,θ)−P(q,α)
The ex-post implementability of each price schedule P(q,α) is ensured by the usual
Envelope condition sθ (θ ,α) = uθ (q(θ ,α),θ) and the requirement that q(θ ,α) be
non-decreasing in θ .
These conditions allow us to write the expected utility of a type α consumer from
choosing the tariff P(q, α˜) as
v(α, α˜) = s(θL, α˜)+
∫ θH
θL
uθ (q(θ , α˜),θ) [1−F(θ ,α)] dθ (A.1)
Define the maximum of this function as
V (α) = max
αL≤α˜≤αH
v(α, α˜) (A.2)
Then to implement the menu of tariffs we need to ensure that V (α) is maximized at
α = α˜ . This yields a second Envelope condition
V ′(α) =−
∫ θH
θL
uθ (q(θ ,α),θ)Fα(θ ,α)dθ ≥ 0 (A.3)
The fact that V ′(α) is non-negative follows from the the condition that uθ > 0 and
Fα ≤ 0 in case of Assumption 1.
Under Assumption 2 it follows from the fact that q(θ ,α) is non-decreasing in θ , the
single-crossing property uqθ > 0, and the conditions imposed on the integral of Fα .
Now as V (α) is weakly increasing in α , if the participation constraint is satisfied
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for the lowest type αL, it is necessarily satisfied for all other α > αL. Thus it is optimal
for the firm to set V (αL) equal to the outside option which we will normalize to zero,
i.e. V (αL) = 0.
Therefore the rent of a type α consumer under any incentive compatible scheme
will be
V (α) =−
∫ αH
αL
∫ θH
θL
uθ (q(θ , α˜).θ)Fα(θ , α˜)dθ dα˜ (A.4)
and by (A.1)
s(θL,α) =V (α)−
∫ θH
θL
uθ (q(θ ,α),θ) [1−F(θ ,α)] dθ (A.5)
Lemma 5. (Armstrong (1996)) Under Assumption 1, if the function s(θL,α) in (A.1)
is given by (A.5), then the type α consumer will choose α˜ = α in (A.1) provided that
q(θ ,α) is (weakly) increasing in α .
Proof. Using the expression in (A.1) and differentiating with respect to α˜ yields
vα˜(α, α˜) =
∫ θH
θL
uqθ (q(θ , α˜),θ)qα(θ , α˜) [F(θ , α˜)−F(θ ,α)] dθ
Under Assumption 1, v(α, α˜) is increasing for all α˜ < α and decreasing for all α˜ >
α as long as qα ≥ 0. Thus a sufficient condition for ex-ante implementability under
Assumption 1 is that q(θ ,α) be weakly increasing in α .
Lemma 6. Under Assumption 2 and 3, if the function s(θL,α) in (A.1) is given by
(A.5), then the type α consumer will choose α˜ = α in (A.1) provided that q(θ ,α) is
weakly decreasing in α for all θ ≤ z, and weakly increasing in α for all θ ≥ z.
Proof. To see this first look at the case α˜ < α . In this case F(θ , α˜)−F(θ ,α) is less
or equal to zero for all θ ≤ z and greater or equal to zero for all θ ≥ z. Thus under
the assumptions imposed on qα , qα(θ , α˜)[F(θ , α˜)−F(θ ,α)] will be greater or equal
to zero on θ ∈ [θL,θH ], and therefore v(α, α˜) will be weakly increasing in α˜ for all
α˜ < α . The reverse holds true for α˜ > α , i.e. v(α, α˜) will be weakly decreasing on
85
this interval. It follows that v(α, α˜) reaches its maximum at α˜ = α .
Firm’s profits from a customer of type α are
∫ θH
θL
[u(q(θ ,α),θ)−C(q(θ ,α)] f (θ , αˆ)dθ−∫ θH
θL
uθ (q(θ ,α),θ) [1−F(θ , αˆ)] dθ − s(θL,α)
Add and subtract V (α) from this expression to get
∫ θH
θL
{
u(q(θ ,α),θ)+uθ (q(θ ,α),θ)
[
F(θ , αˆ)−F(θ ,α)
f (θ , αˆ)
]
−C(q(θ ,α)
}
f (θ , αˆ)dθ−V (α)
Total profits are
pi =
∫ αH
αL
{∫ θH
θL
[
u(q(θ ,α),θ)+uθ (q(θ ,α),θ)
[
F(θ , αˆ)−F(θ ,α)
f (θ , αˆ)
]
−C(q(θ ,α)] f (θ , αˆ)dθ −V (α)}dG(α)
Integrating by parts using (A.3) we have
∫ αH
αL
V (α)dG(α) =−
∫ αH
αL
∫ θH
θL
uθ (q(θ ,α),θ)Fα(θ ,α)[1−G(α)]dθ dα
Substituting this expression back into the firm’s profits yields
∫ αH
αL
∫ θH
θL
Λm(q(θ ,α),θ ,α) f (θ , αˆ)g(α)dθ dα (A.6)
where
Λm(q,θ ,α) = u(q,θ)+uθ (q,θ)
[
F(θ , αˆ)−F(θ ,α)
f (θ , αˆ)
]
−C(q)+uθ (q,θ)Fα(θ ,α)f (θ , αˆ)
(
1−G(α)
g(α)
)
(A.7)
To maximize profits, we can maximize Λm for each combination of (θ ,α) pointwise
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with respect to q, i.e.
q(θ ,α) = argmax
q≥0
Λm(q,θ ,α) (A.8)
If Λm is strictly quasi-concave in q, the optimal quantity schedule is given by the first
order condition
Λmq (q(θ ,α),θ) = 0 (A.9)
If furthermore Λm is supermodular in (q,θ), then q(θ ,α) will be (weakly) increasing
in θ .
For optimality we also require qα(θ ,α)≥ 0 under Assumption 1. Under Assumptions
2 and 3 we require that qα(θ ,α)≤ 0 for all θ < z and qα(θ ,α)≥ 0 for all θ > z.
The quantity schedule defined by (A.9) deviates from the efficient quantity sched-
ule which equates marginal utility to marginal cost, i.e uq(q(θ ,α),θ) = C′(q(θ ,α)),
in two terms. The term uqθ [F(θ , αˆ)−F(θ ,α)]/ f (θ , αˆ) arises from the firm’s attempt
to create fictitious surplus. The second source of inefficiency is the usual distortion
imposed on low α types in order to extract more surplus from high α types.
While the first distortion disappears for the fully rational type αˆ , the second only dis-
appears for the highest type αH . This obviously implies that the quantity schedules
q(θ ,α) will be inefficient for all types α , unless αH = αˆ in which case there will be
no distortions at the top.
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.0.1 Calibration of the Transaction Tax
To simulate prices and trades in our model with transaction taxes we first need to quan-
tify the size of the potential upward movement in the fundamental value λh as, unlike
in the model without taxes, this quantity enters the calculations for the equilibrium
thresholds.
Unlike in our theoretical model, observed price changes for our stock across days will
be due to two kinds of events. Firstly, those that were private information of traders and
were revealed to the market during the course of trading. These changes are what λh
and λl = δ/(1−δ )λh in our model refer to. Secondly, there will be price changes that
are due to events that became public information during or after the trading day without
previously having been private information of any of our traders. To get a measure of
λh we need to “clean” stock prices of such public information events. To do so we
will perform a variance decomposition suggested by Hasbrouck [Hasbrouck, 1991]
that allows us to decompose stock price changes into a trade-correlated component,
interpreted as the component driven by private information, and a trade-uncorrelated
component.
We start by assuming that the difference between opening and closing price of the
security on any given trading day d, ∆Pd , consists of two components : a private com-
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ponent Xd and a public component Yd . Furthermore let us assume that Xd and Yd are
independent random variables. Then we have
Var(∆Pd) = Var(Xd +Yd) = Var(Xd)+Var(Yd)
We know the theoretical distribution of Xt . We have
Xt =

λh with probability αδ
0 with probability 1−α(
δ
1−δ
)
λh with probability α(1−δ )
From the martingale property of prices we have E(Xt) = 0. It follows that
Var(Xt) = αδλ 2h +α(1−δ )
(
δ
1−δ
)2
λ 2 =
(
αδ
1−δ
)
λ 2h
We now perform Hasbrouck’s variance decomposition [Hasbrouck, 1991] to determine
what fraction of the total variance of price changes Var(∆Pd) is due to private infor-
mation. To do so we use the intraday quotes and trades data for the Ashland stock
described in the Data Section, where trades are signed using the Lee-Ready algorithm.
We estimate Hasbrouck’s vector autoregressive system ( using a lag length of 5 trading
periods ) for the evolution of quote revisions and signed trades. From our estimates we
recover Hasbrouck suggested measure of relative trade informative R2w = σ2w,x/σ2w ( see
p.577 [Hasbrouck, 1991] ). We have
σ2w,x = 1.0344×10−7 , σw = 6.0169×10−7 and R2w = 0.1705
Thus this decomposition suggests that 17.05% of the variance of intraday price changes
Var(∆Pt) is due to private information, that is
Var(Xd) = R2w Var(∆Pd) = 0.1705Var(∆Pd)
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Using the difference between daily closing and opening prices of Ashland Inc. for
our sample period we estimate the standard deviation of the daily price changes to be
σ (∆Pt) = 0.3691. Our estimates for the parameters are α = 0.2803 and δ = 0.6238.
The variance decomposition together with the previously obtained expression for the
variance of Xt now allows us to get a value for λh as follows
λh = σ(∆Pd)
√
R2w
(
1−δ
αδ
)
= 0.2236
In our simulations, we simulate the effect of a 0.1%, 0.2% and 0.5% financial transac-
tion tax. As our tax ρ applies to one unit of the stock traded at a time, we calculate ρ
as a percentage of the average opening price of Ashland Inc. over our sample period
which is P¯ = 34.13. The value of ρ/λh for different tax rates, an expression which is
needed for calculation of the equilibrium trading thresholds of our model, is then given
in Table B.1.
tax 0.1 % 0.2 % 0.5 %
ρ/λh 0.1526 0.3053 0.7632
Table B.1: Calibration of FTT
We see that for tax rates in the suggested range for the FTT, our estimations suggest
that for Ashland Inc. the transaction costs caused by such a tax would be between
15% ( 0.01% tax ) and 75% ( 0.05% tax ) of the maximum possible gain from private
information (λh).
B.0.2 Informational Cascades
To lighten notation define as αˆt = Pr(V d 6= vd−1|Ht) the posterior probability concern-
ing the occurrence of an information event where {Ht} is the filtration induced by the
trading process. Also define as qˆt = Pr(V d = vdh|V d 6= vd−1,Ht) the posterior proba-
bility of a good event given that an informational event has occurred. αt and qt denote
realizations of these random variables, that is posteriors for a given trading history
ht ∈Ht .
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Lemma 1 αˆt converges almost surely to I{V d 6=vd−1}.
Sketch of Proof The proof follows standard steps in establishing convergence for
Bayesian learning: The posterior probability αˆt is a martingale with respect to the
filtration {Ht} induced by the trading process. As posterior probabilities are bounded,
we know by the Martingale Convergence Theorem that the posterior probability will
converge almost surely to some random variable Y∞. As the probability of observing a
trade differs across type of event day, it has to be the case that Y∞ = I{V d 6=vd−1}.
Proposition 7 If ρ <
(
2τδ
1−τ|2δ−1|
)
λh, on an event day an informational cascade occurs
only if Pr(V d = vdh|hdt ) has reached either an lower threshold r∗ or an upper threshold
1− r∗, where r∗ is the smallest root of the quadratic equation
2(1− r)pτ
1− (2r−1)τ = (1−δ )
ρ
λh
.
The root r is increasing in the transaction tax ρ and decreasing in τ,δ , and λh.
If ρ >
(
2τδ
1−τ|2δ−1|
)
λh, in an event day, informed traders never trade for all t. The
probability of a good event converges almost surely to Pr(V d = vdh|hdt ) = δ .
Proof Informed traders do not trade after trading history ht if (and only if) the following
two inequalities hold:
E(V d|St = 1,ht)< at +ρ
E(V d|St = 0,ht)> bt−ρ,
that is an informed trader with the best possible signal (St = 1) does not want to buy, and
an informed trader with the worst possible signal (St = 0) does not want to sell given
ask and bid prices and the transaction tax. If informed traders do not trade, equilibrium
ask and bid prices are equal to E(V d|ht). It follows that informed traders do not trade
after history ht if (and only if)
E(V d|St = 1,ht)−E(V d|ht)< ρ
E(V d|ht)−E(V d|St = 0,ht)< ρ.
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Now consider the first trading opportunity on a given day. We have Pr(V d = vdh| /0) =
α ·δ and E(V d| /0) = vd−1. Thus informed traders do not trade iff
(1+ τ)δ − (1− τ)(1−δ )
(
δ
1−δ
)
(1+ τ)δ +(1− τ)(1−δ )
λh < ρ
−
(1− τ)δ − (1+ τ)(1−δ )
(
δ
1−δ
)
(1− τ)δ +(1+ τ)(1−δ )
λh < ρ.
These inequalities a jointly satisfied iff ρ >
(
2τδ
1−τ|2δ−1|
)
λh ≡ ρ¯ . Lastly, note that as
informed traders do not trade, no matter what action is observed at the first trading
opportunity the market maker’s beliefs in the next period are q1 = δ and therefore
E(V d|h1) = vd−1 for any history h1. Again, informed traders will not trade at the
second trading opportunity and so on.
Now consider taxes such that ρ < ρ¯ . By Lemma 1 we know that Pr(V d = vdh|Ht)
converges almost surely to 0 on days without informational event. On days with in-
formational event αˆt converges to 1 almost surely and consequently E(V d|Ht) and
E(V d|V d 6= vd−1,Ht) converge almost surely to the same random variable. 1 Thus for
almost all trading histories on event days there exists a T such that if t > T informed
traders do not trade if and only if
E(V d|St = 1,ht)−E(V d|V d 6= vd−1,ht)< ρ
E(V d|V d 6= vd−1,ht)−E(V d|St = 0,ht)< ρ.
These two inequalities are equivalent to
2(1−qt)qtτ
1− (2qt−1)τ < (1−δ )
ρ
λh
2(1−qt)qtτ
1− (1−2qt)τ < (1−δ )
ρ
λh
.
1Convergence is guaranteed by the Martingale Convergence Theorem and the fact that Pr(V d =
vdh |Ht) is a bounded martingale.
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Figure B.1: Determination of Roots. Red curves correspond to signals S = 1, blue curves to
S = 0. Dotted curves have τ = 0.3, solid curves have τ = 0.6. Intersections of the
red curves with horizontal line occur at p1 and p2, intersections of the blue curves
with the horizontal line occur at p3 and p4.
Figure B.1 illustrates these inequalities graphically. The first inequality is satisfied for
values of qt on the dotted line falling outside the interior of the red hyperbola. The
second inequality is satisfied for qt on the dotted line falling outside the interior of the
blue hyperbola. p1 and p2 are the intersections of the dotted line with the red hyperbola.
They are given by the two roots of the quadratic equation
2(1− p)pτ
1− (2p−1)τ = (1−δ )
ρ
λh
p3 and p4 are the intersections of the dotted line with the blue hyperbola. They are
given by the two roots of the quadratic equation
2(1− p)pτ
1− (1−2p)τ = (1−δ )
ρ
λh
Note that if p solves the first equation, 1− p solves the second, so we have p1 = 1− p4
and p2 = 1− p3. Simple calculations show that the maximum of both hyperbolas is
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1−
√
1−τ2
τ and that we have
(1−δ ) ρ¯
λh
≤ 1−
√
1− τ2
τ
Thus if ρ < ρ¯ both equations will have two real roots, graphically the dotted line will
intersect both hyperbolas.
It follows for almost all histories ht and large enough t that informed traders do not trade
if and only if qt 6= (p1, p2)∪ (1− p2,1− p1). By the Martingale Convergence Theorem
we know that qˆt converges almost surely. If informed traders trade, this posterior would
change after observing a trade. Thus the posterior has to converge to a random variable
X∞ with Pr (X∞ ∈ (p1, p2)∪ (1− p2,1− p1)) = 0. 
B.0.3 Estimation Results for Simulated Data
The following tables report estimates for simulated data generated by our basic 6 pa-
rameter model without transaction taxes. We simulated data for three sets of parameters
and then estimated these parameters by maximum likelihood using the likelihood func-
tion derived in section 3.5. We maximised the likelihood function numerically using
the Nelder-Mead algorithm as implemented by the Numerical Algorithm Group (NAG)
for their Matlab toolbox. The following tables reports the best estimates we have ob-
tained. For each set of parameters we have simulated data for two different seeds and
for 220, 500, and 1000 trading days each having 149 trading opportunities per day.
α δ µ τ ψ ε
simulation 0.28 0.62 0.42 0.45 0.2 0.8
220 days 0.32 0.58 0.42 0.51 0.26 0.80
500 days 0.29 0.65 0.41 0.46 0.33 0.79
1000 days 0.29 0.59 0.42 0.43 0.17 0.80
Table B.2: Estimates for Simulation 1, Seed 1.
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α δ µ τ ψ ε
simulation 0.28 0.62 0.42 0.45 0.2 0.8
220 days 0.28 0.52 0.44 0.42 0.16 0.80
500 days 0.28 0.59 0.43 0.40 0.23 0.79
1000 days 0.30 0.60 0.42 0.44 0.20 0.80
Table B.3: Estimates for Simulation 1, Seed 2.
α δ µ τ ψ ε
simulation 0.60 0.52 0.16 0.80 0.35 0.6
220 days 0.43 0.54 0.18 0.65 0.06 0.67
500 days 0.40 0.63 0.21 0.53 0.14 0.68
1000 days 0.56 0.50 0.16 0.78 0.37 0.59
Table B.4: Estimates for Simulation 2, Seed 1.
α δ µ τ ψ ε
simulation 0.60 0.52 0.16 0.80 0.35 0.6
220 days 0.44 0.54 0.17 0.99 0.09 0.68
500 days 0.51 0.60 0.16 0.78 0.21 0.66
1000 days 0.69 0.53 0.18 0.77 0.47 0.53
Table B.5: Estimates for Simulation 2, Seed 2.
α δ µ τ ψ ε
simulation 0.30 0.72 0.26 0.60 0.40 0.35
220 days 0.33 0.50 0.29 0.53 0.39 0.35
500 days 0.29 0.69 0.27 0.64 0.36 0.39
1000 days 0.30 0.69 0.26 0.62 0.39 0.36
Table B.6: Estimates for Simulation 3, Seed 1.
α δ µ τ ψ ε
simulation 0.30 0.72 0.26 0.60 0.40 0.35
220 days 0.33 0.73 0.24 0.59 0.37 0.36
500 days 0.32 0.80 0.26 0.53 0.44 0.30
1000 days 0.32 0.71 0.25 0.62 0.40 0.35
Table B.7: Estimates for Simulation 3, Seed 2.
Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4
C.0.4 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We need to prove that liquidation only occurs in the first period and only does
so with strictly positive probability for beliefs µ < µ∗ ≡ 2l/(1+ l).
First consider a simplified setting in which liquidation can only occur in the first
period. If the project is not liquidated by either party in the first period it will continue
until maturity. In this case the planner’s objective function is
{
µλ +(1−µ)[1− (1−λ )2]} l+ [µ(1−λ )+(1−µ)(1−λ )2]µ ′
where λ is the symmetric liquidation probability. By Bayes’ Rule we have
µ ′ =
µ
µ+(1−µ)(1−λ )
The objective function thus simplifies to
λ [(2−λ )(1−µ)+µ] l+(1−λ )µ
which is strictly concave in λ . Here the optimal liquidation probability, which we
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designate by λ (µ), is
λ (µ) =

1
2
[
1− µ−l(1−µ)l
]
if µ < µ∗
0 otherwise.
Now consider the Bellman Equation of the original planner problem (4.4). To simplify
the analysis we subtract µ from both sides and define W˜ (µ) = W (µ)− µ . Together
with µ = [1−λ (1−µ)]µ ′ which follows from Bayes’ Rule (4.3) we obtain
W˜ (µ) = max
λ∈[0,1]
{
λ [(2−λ )(1−µ)l− (1− l)µ]+ (1−λ )(1−λ [1−µ])γW˜ (µ ′)}
Suppose the policy of liquidating with probability λ (µ) in the initial period upon re-
ceiving a bad signal and never thereafter is also the optimal policy for the original
problem. Then the value function corresponding to this policy, namely
G(µ) =
λ (µ) [(2−λ (µ))(1−µ)l− (1− l)µ] if µ < µ
∗
0 otherwise
should also satisfy the above Bellman Equation.
To see that this is the case we substitute G into the Bellman Equation and verify that it
indeed solves the functional equation, that is
G(µ)= max
λ∈[0,1]
{
λ [(2−λ )(1−µ)l− (1− l)µ]+ (1−λ )(1−λ [1−µ])γG
(
µ
1−λ (1−µ)
)}
The function inside the curly brackets is strictly concave in λ with first derivative given
by (1− γ)[(1−µ)l− (µ− l)−2λ (1−µ)l] for λ < λ (µ)(1−µ)l− (µ− l)−2λ (1−µ)l for λ ≥ λ (µ)
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and second derivative −2(1− γ)(1−µ)l < 0 if λ < λ (µ)−2(1−µ)l < 0 if λ ≥ λ (µ)
For µ < µ∗ the maximum is achieved by an interior solution characterized by the first
order condition
(1−µ)l− (µ− l)−2λ (1−µ)l = 0 ⇔ λ (µ) = 1
2
[
1− µ− l
(1−µ)l
]
For µ ≥ µ∗ the maximum is achieved by the corner solution λ (µ) = 0. Hence G indeed
satisfies the Bellman Equation.
Appendix D
Note on Cojoint Work
The research presented in chapter 3 of this thesis, Financial Transaction Taxes and
the Informational Efficiency of Financial Market: A Structural Estimation, is based
on joint research with Marco Cipriani and Antonio Guarino. Each co-author has con-
tributed equally to this project. I thank both of them for the fruitful cooperation.
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